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Preface
Health and education are two fields of economic research that are of relevance to
the political agenda in most developed countries. Governments play a major role in
organizing and financing health care and the education system. Market imperfections
in both areas are put forward as rationale for government intervention (Poterba, 1996).
Imperfections in the health care market result mostly from informational asymme-
tries. As future health care needs are to a large extent uncertain, a high proportion of
individuals demand insurance. Asymmetric distributions of information between the
insurer and the user of health care, however, complicate the organization of health
insurance. In particular, adverse selection and moral hazard may occur.
When the individuals who buy insurance are heterogeneous in terms of the insured
risk and when they have more information on their risk than the insurer, adverse
selection may result in market failure. Given a choice between different insurance
products, high risk individuals who know about their risk tend to choose generous
coverage. Correspondingly, individuals who know that their risk is lower tend to select
out of the respective insurance plans. Lower risk individuals are thus not able to obtain
comprehensive insurance coverage at a price corresponding to their risk (Cutler and
Zeckhauser, 2000, p. 606ff).
Moral hazard, on the other hand, induces individuals to demand more care than
they would if they were not insured. Once individuals are insured, they do not have
to bear the full costs of medical treatments. If the insurer cannot observe the individ-
uals’ actions or has limited means of judging whether a certain treatment is medically
indicated, individuals might demand more – or more expensive – care than necessary.
Copayments and other restrictions in the scope of insurance coverage are instruments
to counteract this problem (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000, p. 576ff).
In the education system, market imperfections are mostly linked to externalities
(Poterba, 1996). Not only the individual schooled but also the overall economy might
profit from the individual’s education. Education might, for example, help to adopt new
technologies of production and foster economic growth. When individuals choose their
level of education solely based on their individual costs and benefits, and do not take
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into account the benefits that accrue for society as a whole, they may choose a lower
than socially optimal level of education. It is thus frequently seen as a government
responsibility to subsidize the education system in order to induce socially optimal
levels of education (Hanushek, 2002, p. 2064f.).
Health and education are on the political agenda today for different reasons. Health
care costs have risen over the last decades. As a lot of the spending is public expen-
diture, reforms of the health care system are needed to reduce costs and to comply
with fiscal restrictions. Improving the education system is seen as a key to ensuring
international competitiveness. While the question is not finally settled, the evidence is
accruing that higher levels of education foster economic growth (Hanushek and Woess-
mann, 2009).
In order to provide guidance to respective reform efforts, empirical research brings
together theoretical concepts, statistical methods and data. This dissertation con-
tributes four empirical studies on questions related to health and education. Each
of the studies constitutes a self-contained chapter. The first three chapters focus on
the individual assessments of health risks and the organization of health care markets.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of teaching methods on student achievement.
The analysis in chapter 1 is motivated by a puzzle in the literature on adverse se-
lection. There is differential evidence of adverse selection in markets that are related
to similar risks. In particular, empirical studies on life insurance markets find little
evidence of adverse selection but there is evidence of adverse selection in annuity mar-
kets. Similarly, for some health insurance markets there is evidence of adverse selection,
while others do not seem to be adversely selected. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) suggest
that different degrees of private information in the different markets result in different
scopes for adverse selection and might thus reconcile the mixed findings. Chapter 1
provides an empirical evaluation of this explanation.
As similar risks are insured in the different markets, individual information on the
risks is likely the same. Differences in private information could result from differences
in what the insurers know about the risks. The latter difference in turn can stem from
differences in information that the insurers collect and use for insurance underwriting,
i.e. for risk assessment and calculation of premia.
A challenge of this analysis is thus to find a data set that includes information
on individuals’ and insurers’ risk assessments for potential buyers of insurance. As in
many circumstances everyone can potentially buy insurance, the analysis requires a
sample of the general population. Within general population surveys, however, typi-
cally only a limited set of information on individual health risk factors are available.
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The data set used in chapter 1 is an exception. It comes from the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (ELSA). ELSA collects a large set of variables that are typically also
collected in the application process in some insurance markets. In particular, ELSA
is one of the rare data sets that includes objectively measured health information col-
lected by a nurse. As applicants in health-related insurance markets, such as private
health insurance and life insurance, typically have to disclose information from medi-
cal examinations, ELSA is better suited to mimic the insurers’ information than other
surveys of the general population.
ELSA also comprises variables that can proxy for the potential buyers’ information
on their risk. The main analysis in chapter 1 uses individuals’ assessment of their
general health as measure for the individual information. The measure is derived from
a question in which individuals are asked to rate their general health on a 5-point scale
from very good to very bad. The advantage that this measure has for the purpose of
my study is that it is subjective. It cannot be verified by a third party. Information
that is only contained in this self-rated health measure therefore necessarily remains
private.
Furthermore, ELSA is a panel study and thus tracks individuals over time. This
allows to observe whether individuals actually experience the insured events in the
future. In order to detect private information the statistical analysis conducted in
chapter 1 combines the information on the occurrence of the insured event in the
future, the proxy for the potential buyer’s information on the risk and the application
information that insurers use for risk assessment. It is interpreted as evidence for
private information if the proxy for the potential buyer’s information helps to predict
the future occurrence of the risks when the insurer’s information is controlled for.
The analysis shows that depending on the information that is used by the insurer to
assess the potential buyers’ risk there are varying degrees of private information. The
results can help to reconcile the mixed evidence on adverse selection in life insurance
and annuity markets and in different health insurance markets. Furthermore, the
results indicate that adverse selection may be overcome by accurate risk assessments
by the insurers in the different insurance markets.
In contrast to chapter 1, the analysis in chapter 2 takes a direct approach to mea-
suring individual risk perception by asking individuals how they rate their chances of
developing different diseases in the future. Following the insights on measuring expec-
tations summarized by Manski (2004), Joachim Winter and I implemented a survey on
health expectations in the American Life Panel (ALP), an Internet panel administered
by RAND. We elicit the subjective health expectations as numerical probabilities. This
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has an advantage over qualitative questions as it allows to gauge the accuracy of the
individual information by directly comparing it to objective probabilities.
The analysis presented in chapter 2 uses the subjective probabilities to shed light on
the question whether individuals who are overweight or obese are misinformed about
their health risks. The accuracy of risk perception among smokers has been analyzed
based on similar subjective probabilities by Schoenbaum (1997) and Khwaja et al.
(2009). For individuals with excess weight a comparable study is not available so far.
Similar to smoking, obesity is responsible for a large share of health care costs
(Cawley and Meyerhoefer, 2010). Furthermore, being obese is at least partly influenced
by individual behavior. Behavioral changes could help to decrease an individual’s body
weight. However, changes in behavior require an effort from the individual. From
a rational choice perspective, rational individuals would only engage in behavioral
changes if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. If individuals who are overweight
or obese underestimate their health risks, this implies that they underestimate the
benefits of behavioral changes.
While smokers are generally not found to underestimate their health risks, the re-
sults for the overweight and obese presented in chapter 2 indicate that obese individuals
underestimate the risks of certain diseases. These results indicate that there is room
for health education programs targeted at the obese population. More drastic cam-
paigns on the risks of obesity similar to the campaigns on the risks of smoking might
be needed in order to make individuals aware of their risks.
The third chapter is based on joint work with Helmut Farbmacher. Its focus lies
on evaluating the effects of a recent reform in the German statutory health insurance
system that increased copayments for doctor visits and prescription drugs in an effort
to counteract moral hazard and thereby achieve cost containment. Augurzky et al.
(2006), Schreyögg and Grabka (2010), Farbmacher (2010) and Rückert et al. (2008)
have analyzed how the reform affected health care use among the statutorily insured
in Germany. The studies present inconclusive results on whether the reform changed
individual behavior.
The analysis presented in the third chapter contributes to this literature by using
a new data set. While the earlier studies rely on survey data, the data analyzed in
chapter 3 is insurance claims data. It thus allows to reliably observe health care use.
More importantly, however, the analysis goes beyond studying the average effect of
the reform. It focuses on the question whether different groups of individuals react
differently to the reform. Bago d’Uva (2006) and Winkelmann (2006) find that the
health care demand among individuals with high use of health care is less sensitive to
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changes in prices than the demand among individuals with low use. We expand on
these two studies by changing the focus from demand for health care in general, to the
demand for different types of health care, namely visiting two different types of doctors
– general practitioners (GPs) and specialists.
In order to conduct this analysis we develop a finite mixture bivariate probit model.
On the one hand, this model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in terms of different
latent classes of individuals. In particular, we assume that there are two groups of
individuals that may differ in any observed and unobserved aspect. However, we do
not observe which individual belongs to which group. After the estimation of the
model we can characterize the different groups in terms of their health care use. On
the other hand, the bivariate probit component of the model allows to estimate how
the probability to visit different types of doctors is affected within each of the two
latent groups.
Our results indicate that the reform had an effect on individual behavior. On
average individuals are 3 percentage points less likely to visit any type of doctor at
least once within a year after the reform. In the application of the finite mixture
bivariate probit model, we find that the two latent groups can be characterized as
being likely to see a doctor and as being less-likely to see a doctor before the reform.
The estimated probability of belonging to the likely users is 74%, indicating that this is
the majority of the population. Similar to Bago d’Uva (2006) and Winkelmann (2006)
we find that the demand for health care is relatively more elastic among individuals
who are less-likely to see a doctor before the reform.
Furthermore, distinguishing between the two types of doctor visits, we find that
the patterns of use change differently in the different groups. While the reform induces
the less-likely users to reduce their probability of visiting both types of doctors, the
likely users still visit GPs with the same probability after the reform. However, they
visit a specialist with a smaller probability.
This result has an important implication for designing health care systems. The
copayments do not force individuals to stop visiting specialists. A large part of the
population, however, visits a specialist with a smaller probability and instead focuses
on GP visits as consequence of the reform. The GPs’ function in the health care
system was therefore strengthened by the reform. Even though the reform did not
implement gatekeepers directly, meaning that individuals still have a choice between
general practice and specialist care, it might have implemented effective incentives that
induce a large fraction of the population to use GPs as if they were gatekeepers. As
it has been suggested that gatekeeping leads to lower health care costs (Scott, 2000),
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the particular reform in the German health insurance might guide a way to introduce
gatekeeping without force.
The final chapter draws on joint work with Guido Schwerdt. It shifts the focus
from health care reform to improving the education system. It attempts to answer
the question whether traditional teaching methods are related to worse educational
outcomes than more modern approaches.
We use a data set for 8th grade students in the US from the Trends in Interna-
tional Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 2003. This data set has two major
advantages for our analysis and one disadvantage. The first advantage is that the data
allows to match students to teachers and we thus know which student was taught by
which teachers. The second advantage is the panel dimension, namely that we observe
each student in two subjects. We observe how a student performed on the TIMSS tests
in math and in science and which methods the teacher used in teaching the specific
subject. Taking differences between math and science for each student we employ a
first-difference method that allows us to control for any unobserved student traits that
are constant between the two subjects.
The disadvantage of the data set is that there is no random variation in teaching
methods. Teachers instead choose freely which methods they employ in teaching. Even
though we can control for unobserved student characteristics, such as innate ability
or motivation, we are not able to identify causal effects of teaching methods. For
example, there might be some unobserved teacher characteristic that induces teachers
to choose a specific teaching method. If this teacher characteristic also makes a teacher
a good teacher, the estimated effect of the teaching method will be confounded with the
effect of the teacher characteristic. We evaluate how important this selection based on
unobservable teacher characteristics is by borrowing a method pioneered in Altonji et al.
(2005). This method essentially allows to estimate how large selection on unobservable
characteristics would have to be compared to selection on observable characteristics in
order to explain an entire estimated effect.
The specific focus of our paper lies on comparing teaching using lecture style pre-
sentation with teaching based on in-class problem solving. Our results indicate that
spending more time in class on lecture style teaching is significantly positively related
to student performance, when controlling for subject-constant student traits. However,
the application of the method pioneered by Altonji et al. indicates that selection on
unobservable teacher traits could explain the entire estimated effect. We therefore re-
frain from interpreting the estimated effect as causal and do not draw conclusions that
call for more lecture style teaching. Nevertheless, based on our results it is implausible
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that there is a negative effect of lecture style teaching. As our method helps to control
for all other confounding factors, a true negative effect would only be consistent with
finding a positive correlation between lecture style teaching and student achievement
if good teachers choose to teach with the bad teaching method. This, however, seems
to be rather implausible.
Chapter 1
Do I know more than my body can
tell? An Empirical Analysis of Private
Information in Health-Related
Insurance Markets
1.1 Introduction
Information asymmetries about risk types in competitive insurance markets are known
to induce inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection. In particular, the seminal model
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and various extensions robustly predict that higher
risk individuals buy more insurance coverage than lower risk individuals (Chiappori
et al., 2006). The empirical evidence on this matter, however, varies for different
insurance markets (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010).
Several explanations have been put forward to reconcile theoretical and empirical
findings. Multiple dimensions of asymmetric information, for example private infor-
mation on risk preferences in addition to private information on risk type, can explain
the absence of adverse selection in some insurance markets (De Meza and Webb, 2001;
Cutler et al., 2008a). Cohen and Siegelman (2010) suggest the absence of useful pri-
vate information and thus the absence of scope for adverse selection in some but not
in other insurance markets as an additional explanation for the mixed findings.
This chapter evaluates empirically whether different degrees of private information
exist in health-related insurance markets, in particular in the markets for life insurance,
annuities, and health insurance. It attempts to reconcile the mixed findings that have
been presented in the literature on adverse selection in the different insurance markets.
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While life insurance markets and private individual health insurance markets do not
show evidence of adverse selection, annuity markets and group health insurance markets
appear to be adversely selected.
Useful private information on the risk that is to be insured exists if a potential
buyer of an insurance product has more information on the risk than the insurer. Even
though the markets for life insurance and annuities, and different health insurance mar-
kets insure similar risks and individuals thus likely have similar information a priori,
differences in private information between these markets could exist, because insur-
ance companies in the different markets collect and use different types of information
for insurance underwriting, i.e. for risk classification and the calculation of premia.
The variation in information used is at least partly due to legal restrictions. US fed-
eral law, for example, prohibits employers from charging premia for health insurance
based on health-related information (GAO, 2003). Similarly, several US states have
introduced community rating in combination with guaranteed issue laws for individual
health insurance, entitling individuals to buy insurance coverage at a price depending
exclusively on abstract criteria such as sex, age or geographic region (Lo Sasso and
Lurie, 2009). In other private health insurance markets on the contrary health-related
information is used in underwriting.1
Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), I analyze the
scope for private information on the insured risks in life insurance markets, annuity
markets, and health insurance markets by exploiting the different information used in
underwriting in the different insurance markets. As ELSA is a panel study, it allows
to track individuals over time. I can therefore observe whether events happen to the
individuals in the future that would result in insurance claims if the individuals were
insured. I call this the information on the future ‘realization of risk’. In the main
analysis, I interpret it as evidence for private information if a measure of individual’s
self-rated health (SRH) helps to predict the future realization of risk when all infor-
mation that the insurer uses in underwriting is controlled for.
SRH is thus employed as a proxy for individual information on the insured risks.
It was chosen for two reasons: First, it significantly predicts future health events, like
death and the onset of specific health conditions.2 As individuals with worse SRH are
1In addition to legal restrictions, political economy concerns (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2006), speci-
ficities of the market structure (Kesternich and Schumacher, 2009), or different demand for underwrit-
ing in the different markets (Browne and Kamiya, 2009) could explain the use of different information
in underwriting.
2For overviews on studies analyzing the relationship between SRH and subsequent death see Idler
and Benyamini (1997), and DeSalvo et al. (2006). Banks et al. (2007) provide evidence for relationships
between SRH and future diagnoses of diseases.
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more likely to die sooner and more likely to get certain diseases in the future, SRH
presumably captures useful information on the insured risks in the insurance markets
that I focus on. Second, SRH is a non-verifiable measure in the sense that insurance
companies have no means to verify whether an individual’s statement of SRH is true.
This is in contrast to other self-reported measures like an individual’s co-morbidities
or family health history which can be verified by going back to health records. Its
non-verifiability makes SRH particularly valuable for analyzing the existence of private
information. Information about health-related risks that is only contained in SRH
necessarily remains private.
The ELSA data set contains a broad range of health measures that correspond to
the information collected and used by insurance companies in underwriting. ELSA is
one of the few longitudinal data sets that provides health data which are objectively
measured and reported by a nurse: Results of a blood sample analysis, blood pressure
measurement, objectively measured body mass index (BMI), and waist-hip-ratio are
available. As the objectively measured data are already available in an early wave of
the survey, up to 10 years of follow-up can be used for the analysis.3
The realization of the risk that is insured in life insurance and annuity markets
is measured by an indicator for whether an individual dies within 10 years after the
baseline interview. The realization of the insured risk in health insurance markets is
captured by a variable that indicates whether an individual is newly diagnosed or has
a recurrence of heart disease, cancer or stroke within 8 years after the initial interview.
These conditions belong to the most costly conditions at the per capita level (Druss
et al., 2002) and thus seem to be reasonable proxies for the risk insured in health
insurance markets, namely high medical expenses.
My results indicate that SRH contains information on dying within or surviving the
next 10 years and on being diagnosed with one of the costly major health conditions in
the next 8 years, when only a limited number of additional control variables is included
in the analysis. With the inclusion of medical information and in particular with the
inclusion of the objectively measured health data, however, the explanatory power of
SRH is significantly reduced. The explanatory power of SRH for the onset of the costly
health conditions even vanishes completely. These results are robust to using different
proxies for the individual information on risks.
The results in combination with different use of information for underwriting in dif-
ferent insurance markets can help to explain the mixed evidence of adverse selection in
3The US Health and Retirement Study has recently also started to collect objectively measured
health information. Up to now at most 1 wave, i.e. 2 years, of follow-up is available, however.
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life insurance and annuity markets, and in different health insurance markets. While in
life insurance markets stringent underwriting is performed and no evidence is found for
adverse selection, in annuity markets only limited information is used for underwriting
and evidence for adverse selection is found. Similarly, in individual health insurance
with stringent underwriting no evidence is found for adverse selection, while in group
health insurance there is evidence for adverse selection and no individual underwriting
is performed.
An implication of the results is that the scope for adverse selection in group health
insurance markets and annuity markets could be reduced by employing more stringent
underwriting. Whether more stringent underwriting would increase welfare, however,
cannot be determined based on my analysis. While stringent underwriting might miti-
gate the effects of adverse selection, it might have consequences not taken into account
in my analysis. The overall welfare effect of stringent underwriting depends on the ex-
act institutional setting. Health insurance, for example, is often bought in short-term
contracts, that is individuals have to buy coverage repeatedly over time. If every time
when individuals buy coverage stringent underwriting is employed, individuals will face
the risk of ‘becoming a higher risk’ and thus having to pay higher prices for insurance
in the future. Without an insurance for this additional risk stringent underwriting
could reduce welfare.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview on the empirical
evidence of adverse selection in health-related insurance markets, Section 3 introduces
the data used for the analysis. Section 4 outlines the estimation strategy, results are
shown in Section 5, Section 6 reports the results of several robustness analyses, and
the last section concludes.
1.2 Empirical Literature on Adverse Selection
The empirical literature has analyzed whether adverse selection is present in many
different insurance markets, such as the markets for automobile insurance, crop insur-
ance, long term care, reverse mortgages, life insurance, annuities, and health insurance.
Cohen and Siegelman (2010) provide a recent overview on the empirical findings. In
this section, I focus on the literature concerning the last three markets.
The empirical evidence of adverse selection varies between life insurance and an-
nuity markets. While in markets for annuities evidence for adverse selection is found
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002, 2004, 2006; McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010; Einav et al.,
2010b), there is only very little evidence for adverse selection in life insurance markets.
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He (2009) finds evidence that individuals in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
who newly buy life insurance die earlier than individuals who do not buy life insurance
when controlling for variables that insurance companies use for risk classification and
calculation of premia. However, as there is no objectively measured health information
in the HRS waves that He uses in her analysis, her study might not sufficiently control
for risk classification undertaken by the insurers. Furthermore, Cawley and Philipson
(1999), Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) and McCarthy and Mitchell (2010) find no evidence
for adverse selection in life insurance markets.
With respect to markets for health insurance there are mixed findings on adverse
selection in the literature. Especially the US employer-sponsored health insurance
market is found to suffer from adverse selection. Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) provide
a summary of these studies. Bundorf et al. (2008), Cutler et al. (2009) and Einav et al.
(2010a) provide additional evidence of adverse selection in employer-sponsored health
insurance for different US employers. In the non-group health insurance market there
is evidence for adverse selection in states where community rating in combination with
guaranteed issue laws prohibit health-related underwriting and entitle individuals to
buy insurance coverage (Lo Sasso and Lurie, 2009).
Other health insurance markets, however, are typically not found to suffer from
adverse selection. Buchmueller et al. (2004) show that sicker individuals are not more
likely to buy private supplementary health insurance in France; Propper (1989) and
Doiron et al. (2008) find similar results for the British and Australian private health
insurance markets. Furthermore, the US market for Medigap coverage is not found to
be affected by adverse selection (Fang et al., 2008).
Cutler et al. (2008a) analyze to what degree heterogeneities in risk preferences can
explain the mixed evidence of adverse selection in different insurance markets. They
find that individuals who engage in risky behavior or refrain from risk lowering activities
are less likely to hold life insurance, health insurance and annuities. Refraining from
risky behavior and engaging in risk lowering activities are related to prolonging life, and
thus to being of lower risk in life insurance and of higher risk in annuity markets. The
authors conclude that adverse selection in life insurance markets might be outweighed
by selection on risk preferences, while adverse selection in annuity markets is aggravated
by it. The mixed evidence for adverse selection in different health insurance markets,
however, is difficult to reconcile based on unobserved risk preferences.
The study that is most closely related to mine in terms of the empirical strategy
is Banks et al. (2007). The authors use SRH as a proxy for individual information
on different future health events to detect scope for adverse selection. The focus of
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their study, however, lies in detecting whether there are differential amounts of private
information for individuals at different ages. They find that SRH contains more infor-
mation for older individuals. As objectively measured health data is not included in
their data set, the authors cannot fully investigate the effects of medical underwriting
on the degree of private information.
1.3 Data
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) is a rich panel data set which
contains socio-demographic, economic, and health-related data for individuals that
were born on or before February 29th, 1952 and were living in private homes in England
at the time of the interview in 2002. In addition to those core sample members, younger
partners living in the same household are interviewed as part of ELSA. The sample
was randomly selected from the English population in three repeated cross sections for
the Health Survey for England (HSE) in the years 1998, 1999 and 2001. In addition to
the data from the eligible ELSA subsample of the three HSE years, called ELSA wave
0, I use data from three ELSA waves collected in 2002, 2004 and 2006.4
While ELSA was highly influenced by and modeled on the US Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS), its design differs from that of the HRS in one important feature:
In addition to the biannual interview, every four years a nurse visit is conducted as
part of ELSA. Due to these nurse visits objectively measured blood pressure, results
of a blood sample analysis, and anthropometric data are available. In wave 0, a blood
sample analysis was only carried out for individuals in the 1998 HSE year. As a focus
of this study is the scope for adverse selection when insurance companies are allowed
to collect and use outcomes of medical screening, the analysis is conducted using only
ELSA sample members that were sampled for the 1998 HSE.
The ELSA data in wave 0 contains 8,267 individuals from HSE 1998 (7,807 core
sample members and 459 younger partners). Everyone who was interviewed was eligible
for the nurse visit in the HSE. Core sample members and younger partners from wave 0
are therefore included in this analysis. As table 1.1 shows, the data contains information
on age, gender, race, social occupational class, martial status, and smoking status for
nearly all individuals in the sample. Individuals older than 90 are not included in the
analysis as their exact age is not known. This reduces the sample size by 1 percent
and has no significant effects on the results.
Of particular importance for my analysis is the SRH measure in ELSA. Individuals
4For a more thorough description of ELSA see Marmot et al. (2009).
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Table 1.1: Descriptives – ELSA Wave 0
Women Men
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable Mean (% missing) Mean Mean (% missing) Mean
Age
Age < 50 .2 (0.00) .23 .15 (0.00) .18
Age 50-59 .29 (0.00) .34 .31 (0.00) .34
Age 60-69 .24 (0.00) .25 .27 (0.00) .30
Age 70-79 .19 (0.00) .14 .19 (0.00) .15
Age 80-89 .09 (0.00) .04 .07 (0.00) .04
Occupational Class
Professional .05 (0.00) .07 .07 (0.00) .09
Managerial - technical .29 (0.00) .32 .31 (0.00) .33
Skilled - non manual .16 (0.00) .14 .09 (0.00) .09
Skilled - manual .25 (0.00) .27 .33 (0.00) .32
Semi-skilled manual .16 (0.00) .14 .14 (0.00) .13
Unskilled manual .07 (0.00) .05 .05 (0.00) .04
Other social class .03 (0.00) .01 .01 (0.00) .01
Marital Status
Married .62 (0.00) .70 .77 (0.00) .80
Widowed .22 (0.00) .15 .08 (0.00) .06
Separated/divorced/single .16 (0.00) .16 .15 (0.00) .14
Activity Status
Retired .38 (0.00) .32 .41 (0.00) .36
Unemployed .01 (0.00) .02 .03 (0.00) .02
Sick .04 (0.00) .02 .08 (0.00) .06
Working .36 (0.00) .45 .47 (0.00) .54
Inactive .21 (0.00) .19 .02 (0.00) .01
Race
White .97 (0.00) .98 .97 (0.00) .98
Smoking Behavior
Current Smoker .22 (0.00) .19 .22 (0.00) .16
Ever Smoker .56 (0.00) .54 .74 (0.00) .71
N 4,648 1,574 3,556 1,242
Notes:
Columns 1 and 4 - Entire sample
Columns 3 and 6 - Part of sample with no item non-response and no attrition
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Table 1.2: Health Measures – ELSA Wave 0
Women Men
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variable Mean (% missing) Mean Mean (% missing) Mean
Self-Rated Health
Very bad/bad .1 (0.00) .06 .11 (0.00) .06
Fair .25 (0.00) .21 .23 (0.00) .19
Good .39 (0.00) .42 .37 (0.00) .40
Very good .27 (0.00) .32 .29 (0.00) .35
Medical Conditions
Hypertension .3 (0.11) .23 .29 (0.03) .24
Diabetes .04 (0.02) .02 .06 (0.00) .04
Stroke .03 (0.00) .02 .04 (0.03) .02
Heart Attack .03 (0.02) .01 .08 (0.03) .04
Angina .07 (0.00) .04 .1 (0.03) .05
Heart Murmur .04 (0.02) .04 .04 (0.00) .02
Irregular Heart Rhythm .07 (0.00) .05 .08 (0.00) .05
Other Heart Problems .02 (0.02) .01 .03 (0.00) .01
GHQ121 1.61 (6.26) 1.38 1.23 (6.21) .92
No Longstanding Illness (LI)2 .45 (0.04) .51 .43 (0.06) .48
Non-limiting LI .2 (0.04) .21 .22 (0.06) .24
Limiting LI .36 (0.04) .28 .36 (0.06) .29
# Prescription drugs taken 1.85 (14.44) 1.31 1.62 (12.77) 1.1
Use of Medical Services
# of GP visits last 2 weeks .23 (0.02) .2 .2 (0.03) .16
# Hospital nights last year 1.03 (0.04) .45 1.15 (0.08) .51
Family Health History
Father dead .86 (2.32) .83 .89 (2.53) .88
Mother dead .73 (1.61) .67 .76 (1.77) .71
At least one parent died of
Hypertension .01 (1.25) .01 .01 (1.88) .01
Angina .03 (1.25) .02 .02 (1.88) .03
Heart Attack .27 (1.25) .27 .28 (1.88) .27
Other Heart Problem .14 (1.25) .13 .15 (1.88) .15
Stroke .09 (1.25) .09 .08 (1.88) .09
Diabetes .02 (1.25) .03 .02 (1.88) .02
Objective Health Data3
Haemoglobin<13a), 11.5b) g/dL .05 (32.66) .03 .08 (27.33) .06
Haemoglobin>18a), 16.5b) g/dL .002 (32.66) .001 .003 (27.33) .001
Ferritin< 25a), 20b) µg/L .14 (33.91) .14 .06 (28.4) .07
Ferritin>400a), 200b) µg/L .03 (33.91) .02 .02 (28.4) .02
Total cholesterol>5 mmol/L .8 (33.54) .79 .75 (29.67) .77
HDL cholesterol<1a), 1.2b) mmol/L .14 (34.34) .13 .18 (29.84) .17
C-reactive protein>5 mg/L .23 (32.22) .21 .20 (27.18) .16
Fibrinogen<1.7 g/L .01 (41.61) .01 .02 (37.46) .02
Fibrinogen>3.7 g/L .11 (41.61) .11 .1 (37.46) .08
Normal blood pressure untreated .63 (22.93) .75 .6 (22.41) .72
Normal blood pressure treated .17 (22.93) .09 .18 (22.41) .1
High blood pressure treated .09 (22.93) .05 .07 (22.41) .04
Underweight (BMI<20) .04 (11.79) .03 .02 (10.46) .01
Overweight (25≤BMI<30) .38 (11.79) .4 .52 (10.46) .53
Obese (30≤BMI) .25 (11.79) .24 .21 (10.46) .21
Waist-Hip-Ratio> 1a), 0.85b) .29 (16.31) .25 .15 (13.84) .14
N 4,648 1,574 3,556 1,242
Notes:
Columns 1 and 4 - Entire sample, Columns 3 and 6 - Part of sample with no item non-response and no attrition.
112-item General Health Questionnaire, values range from 0 to 12. 2For different longstanding illnesses see table 1.3.
3Reference ranges taken from Oliveira (2008), a)Value for men, b)Value for women.
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in wave 0 were asked “How is your health in general? Would you say it was very good,
good, fair, bad, or very bad?”. The columns 1 and 4 of table 1.2 display mean responses
for the different SRH categories for women and men separately. As there are only few
individuals who rate their health as bad or very bad, I group these two categories into
one.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 display the available health information. As column 2 for women
and column 5 for men of table 1.2 show, self-reported health data and information on
co-morbidities are broadly available. Objectively measured health data, however, is
missing for a relatively large share of individuals. This results mainly from the fact
that the measurement of objective health data is not compulsory. Instead, individuals
can refuse to participate in the nurse visit, and even if they agree to the nurse visit
they can refuse to have a blood sample taken. Overall, all health measures in wave 0
are available for about 50% of the sample.
When analyzing a new diagnosis or recurrence of a major health condition in the
future the sample size shrinks further due to attrition. Information on the future di-
agnosis or recurrence of the health events is derived from an individual’s answers to
questions in the 2002, 2004 and 2006 waves of ELSA. The information is thus only
available for individuals who appear again in ELSA after 1998. Overall, of the 4,305
individuals for whom the objective health data is available in 1998 only 71 percent are
observed at least once in 2002, 2004 or 2006. For the analyses that focus on the future
diagnosis or recurrence of major health conditions, there are thus two selection mecha-
nisms that reduce the sample size. On the one hand, individuals have to participate in
the nurse visit and have to have a blood sample taken. I call this selection mechanism
‘no item non-response’. On the other hand, they have to stay in ELSA in the later
waves, i.e. there is ‘no attrition’.
When the analysis focuses on death, only the first of the two selection mechanisms
is important. Information on death is collected regardless of attrition by linking the
the data to information from the Department of Work and Pensions and to information
contained in the National Health Service Central Register held by the Office of National
Statistics.
As can be inferred from the differences in the means between columns 1 and 3 for
women and between columns 4 and 6 for men in tables 1.1 and 1.2 the individuals who
remain in the sample when item non-response in wave 0 and attrition are taken into
account differ in many aspects from the overall sample. They are on average younger,
more likely to be white or married and less likely to be smokers. Also, they are
healthier in terms of both subjective and objective health measures. If the predictive
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Table 1.3: Prevalence of Different Longstanding Illnesses – Wave 0
Women Men
1 2 3 4
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Cancer .03 .02 .02 .01
Endocrine/metabolic disorders .05 .05 .02 .02
Mental illness .03 .02 .02 .02
Migraine/headaches .02 .02 .01 .01
Other problem nervous system .03 .02 .03 .02
Cataract/poor eye sight .02 .01 .02 .02
Other eye problems .01 .01 .02 .02
Poor hearing/deafness .02 .01 .03 .03
Other ear complaints .04 .01 .05 .02
Complaints of blood vessels .01 .01 .02 .01
Bronchitis/emphysema .01 .01 .02 .01
Asthma .06 .06 .05 .06
Respiratory complaints .02 .02 .03 .03
Stomach ulcer .03 .02 .03 .04
Other digestive complaints .02 .02 .01 .01
Complaints of bowel/colon .04 .03 .02 .02
Reproductive system disorders .01 .02 .02 .02
Arthritis .18 .15 .12 .12
Back problems .06 .06 .08 .08
Problems of bones/joints/muscles .07 .06 .08 .09
Skin complaints .01 .01 .02 .01
N 4,648 1,574 3,556 1,242
Notes: Information on specific longstanding illness is missing for 0.09% of women and 0.06% of men.
Columns 1 and 3 - Entire sample
Columns 2 and 4 - Part of sample with no item non-response and no attrition
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power of SRH for subsequent health events varies with health or age, ignoring the two
selection mechanisms might result in biased estimates. Furthermore, the existence of
unobservable influences on selection that also affect the future health outcomes would
lead to inconsistent estimates when ignoring selection. Inverse probability weighting
is employed to correct for the two selection mechanisms (see appendix to this chapter
for details).
Figure 1.1: SRH and Future Health Events - Men
Figure 1.2: SRH and Future Health Events - Women
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Figures 1.1 and 1.2 present a first glance at the relationship between SRH and the
future health events. There is a graded relationship of SRH and all-cause mortality for
both genders: The better SRH in 1998, the lower the proportion of individuals who are
dead by the year 2008. For men, a similar graded relationship can be observed between
SRH and a diagnosis of a major condition within the next 8 years. For women, the
graded relationship holds for the categories of fair, good, and very good SRH.
1.4 Estimation Strategy
The existence of private information in health insurance, life insurance and annuity
markets is investigated by regressing indicator variables for the occurrence of future
health events on categories of SRH and different control variables in a baseline year.
I include different sets of control variables to capture the information used for un-
derwriting by insurance companies in different insurance markets. The future health
events are meant to capture the future realization of risks. The realization of the risk
that is insured in life insurance and annuity markets is captured by an indicator for
whether an individual is dead 10 years after the baseline interview. The realization of
the insured risk in health insurance markets is captured by a variable that indicates
whether an individual is newly diagnosed or has a recurrence of heart disease, cancer
or stroke within 8 years after the initial interview.
The information on the future health events that is contained in SRH is interpreted
as evidence for private information. SRH might, of course, not capture all private
knowledge on health and mortality risk. SRH asks about health at the time of the
interview and not about expected death or changes in health in the future. A better
suited proxy for private information might be subjective life expectancy.5 This variable
with this information, however, is only elicited starting from ELSA wave 1. As objec-
tively measured health information is only available in wave 0 and 2, using subjective
life expectancy in the analysis would considerably reduce follow-up time. Subjective
life expectancy is, however, used as a proxy for individual information as a robustness
check.
Let yj∗i , j ∈ {D,M} denote latent variables for the future health events, where D
stands for death and M for being diagnosed with a major condition, for individual i.
5Hurd and McGarry (2002) find that subjective life expectancy contains an expectational compo-
nent in addition to the health component that is also captured by SRH.
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Each of the yj∗i ’s can be represented by the following equations
yj∗i = β
j
0 + β
j
1SRH1i + β
j
2SRH2i + β
j
3SRH3i + β
j
4Xai + 
j
i (1.1)
yji = I(y
j∗
i > 0)
where SRHk, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, represent dummies for the three categories, very bad/bad,
good and very good SRH with fair SRH as the reference category. Xai is a vector of
variables that represents the information that insurance companies in insurance market
a collect and use for underwriting.
ji captures unobservables influences on the latent future health event j. Under the
assumptions that ji ∼ N(0, 1) and that the correlation between D and M , ρDM , is
equal to 0, I estimate Pr(yji = 1) for each of the health events independently using
single equation probit models.6
Table 1.4 displays the variables that are typically collected and used in the ap-
plication process in different insurance markets in the UK and in the US. The listed
variables represent information that is used for risk classification and calculation of
premia. As Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) observed, insurance companies may have
additional information about applicants that is not used in underwriting. These “un-
used observables” do not mitigate the scope for adverse selection and are thus not
included as controls in X.
The vector of control variables for the investigation of private information on the
insured risk in group health insurance markets, XGroupHI , does not include any vari-
ables. In the US employer-sponsored health insurance, federal law forbids individual
underwriting (GAO, 2003). In the UK, employer-sponsored private health insurance
also refrains from individual underwriting (Mossialos and Thomson, 2009). In annuity
markets, underwriting is based on the individual’s age and sex. As I estimate sepa-
rate models for men and women the vector of control variables in annuity markets,
XAnnuities, includes only information on age.
Considerably more information is used for underwriting in life and individual health
insurance. In addition to age and sex, information on lifestyle is typically used. Age
and information on an individual’s smoking history are thus included in the vector
of control variables. Furthermore, medical information of individuals and sometimes
also their families can be used for underwriting. The insurers in the UK and some
6The assumption of independence between the error terms can be relaxed and a bivariate equation
probit models be estimated. For this analysis, however, the assumption of independent error terms
seems appropriate as only private information on the particular risk insured in each specific market,
i.e. either the risk of dying/surviving or the risk of high medical expenses, is of interest.
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Table 1.4: Information Used in Underwriting in US and UK Insurance Markets
Health Risk Mortality Risk
Group HIa Individual HIb Annuitiesc Life Insuranced
Age X X X
Sex X X X
Smoking Behavior X X
Medical Conditions X X
Objective Health Data X X
Use of Prescription Drugs X X
Prior Use of Medical Services X
Family Health History (X) X
Occupational Class X X
Alcohol/Substance Abuse X X
Driving Information X X
Residence/Citizenship X X
Dangerous Hobbies X X
Foreign Travel X X
Notes:
a) See GAO (2003) and “Risk Classification” (1999). b) See “Risk Classification” (1999). c) See Cutler
et al. (2008a). d) See Cutler et al. (2008a) and He (2009). The table displays types of information
used in risk classification and calculation of premia in different insurance markets. While in the US
family history is typically not used in underwriting health insurance (“Risk Classification” 1999), it is
used in the UK .
US states can even require insurance applicants to undergo medical examinations.
They thus have clinical information on blood values and other objectively measured
information. To capture the medical information I include self-reported conditions,
linear splines of objectively measured BMI, waist-to-hip ratio, and blood values in
XLife and XIndividualHI . I further use parents’ cause of death as a proxy for familial
medical history.
Insurance companies sometimes use information on occupational status, dangerous
occupations, hazardous hobbies, risky travel destinations, residence/citizenship, and
alcohol or drug abuse for underwriting. As a proxy for occupation, I include dummies
for occupational social class as represented in table 1.1. The other conditions are
unfortunately not well captured in the ELSA data.
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1.5 Results
Average marginal effects of the SRH categories after estimating equation (1.1) are
reported in tables 1.5 to 1.8. The first two tables display average marginal effects of
the SRH categories on whether an individual dies within the next 10 years for men and
women, respectively. Tables 1.7 and 1.8 display average marginal effects of SRH on a
new diagnosis or recurrence of one of the major health conditions, heart disease, cancer
or stroke, in the next 8 years. All tables show results that are weighted to correct for
missing data.7
Column 2 in each of the tables 1.5 and 1.6 is of specific interest. In addition
to SRH the estimated models include the annuity underwriting controls. For both
genders, all three SRH coefficients are significantly different from 0. Conditional on
age, women in very good SRH in 1998 are 8 percentage points less likely to be dead
in 2008 than women who rate their health as fair. Similarly, men in very good SRH
in 1998 are 13 percentage points less likely to be dead in 2008 than men in fair SRH.
When interpreting conditional information in SRH as private information these results
show evidence of a scope for adverse selection in annuity markets.
From left to right in tables 1.5 and 1.6 more control variables are added. The
last columns report average marginal effects of the SRH categories when age, smoking
information, medical conditions, family health history, social occupational class, and
objective health data are included as controls. The p-values of the Wald test for
joint significance indicate that for both genders the three SRH coefficients are still
jointly significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent significance level. The inclusion
of the additional controls, however, and in particular the inclusion of the objectively
measured health information, leads to an attenuation in the average marginal effects
and to a reduction in the significance of the underlying SRH coefficients. Thorough
underwriting, and in particular medical underwriting that includes blood tests and
other objectively measured health data, is thus able to considerably reduce private
information about mortality risks.
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 show similar results for the diagnosis or re-diagnosis of a major
health condition within 8 years after the baseline interview. The results presented in
column 1 of each table indicate that with no controls added in addition to SRH, the
coefficient of the three SRH categories are jointly significantly different from zero for
women and men. When there is no individual underwriting, as in the case of group
7The estimation of the weights is described in the appendix to this chapter. Unweighted results
do not differ significantly from the weighted results.
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health insurance, there is thus private information and therefore scope for adverse
selection.
The inclusion of additional controls from left to right in tables 1.7 and 1.8 results in
a reduction in the information in SRH. For both genders, the inclusion of self-reported
medical conditions and the number of prescription drugs taken as shown in columns 4
of the respective tables leaves no additional explanatory power in SRH for the diagnosis
or re-diagnosis of a major health condition. Taking information in SRH on a future
diagnosis of a major condition as private information, the results indicate that medical
underwriting is a crucial determinant of the degree of private information left in private
health insurance markets.
Overall, the results present evidence that medical underwriting, and in particular
underwriting including medical examinations significantly reduces private information
as captured by SRH. While I find evidence that private information on mortality risks
remains even with stringent underwriting, I find no evidence of private information on
health risks when stringent underwriting is employed. There is evidence, however, for
private information on health risks when no or scarce information is used in underwrit-
ing. Differences in adverse selection between group health insurance markets without
individual underwriting and individual health insurance with stringent individual un-
derwriting can therefore be reconciled precisely by the differences in underwriting.
1.6 Robustness Analyses
In this section, I present different sensitivity analyses. First, the time horizon within
which the realization of risk can occur is shortened to 4 years to investigate whether
individuals have more information on risks in a shorter term. Second, subjective life
expectancy is included in the analysis instead of SRH, as it might be a better proxy for
private information on future health events. Third, I analyze how well the underwrit-
ing controls help to predict the outcomes to gauge the scope for private information
independent of the different proxies for individual information.
Table 1.9 reports the average marginal effects of the three SRH categories when
the dependent variables capture the realization of risk within the next 4 years. Results
for women are displayed in the upper panel, results for men in the lower panel. The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for whether an individual is dead
by ELSA wave 1. In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is an indicator for whether
an individual reports a diagnosis or recurrence of a major health condition in wave 1.
The first column for each event includes a limited set of control variables in addition to
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Table 1.9: Robustness – Event by 2002
Mortality Risk Health Risk
Annuities Life Insurance Group HI Individual HI
1 2 3 4
Women
SRH – very bad/bad .094*** .036 .114 -.032
(.037) (.025) (.163) (.043)
SRH – good -.022 -.002 -.176*** -.003
(.016) (.014) (.055) (.029)
SRH – very good -.022 .002 -.22*** -.004
(.016) (.016) (.055) (.033)
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.917
N 2,184 2,054 1,558 1,557
Pseudo R2 0.2398 0.4303 0.0660 0.3427
Men
SRH – very bad/bad .103** -.004 .136 .005
(.052) (.031) (.116) (.051)
SRH – good -.036* -.015 -.079 -.014
(.02) (.02) (.055) (.033)
SRH – very good -.069*** -.031 -.139** -.076**
(.02) (.022) (.057) (.034)
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.582 0.008 0.08
N 1,766 1,690 1,222 1,204
Pseudo R2 0.2094 0.3719 0.0507 0.3442
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 - test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Notes: Average marginal effects after probit estimation and their standard errors in parentheses.
Different columns include different sets of control variables. Column Annuities includes age splines,
Life Insurance includes age splines, smoking information, medical conditions, number of prescription
drugs taken, family health history, social occupational class, and objective health data, Group HI
includes no controls in addition to SRH, and Individual HI includes the same variables as Life Insurance
plus use of medical services. Results are weighted to correct for missing data.
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SRH, the second column includes the most comprehensive set of underwriting controls.
Similarly to the results of the main analysis, there is significant information in SRH
on dying within the next 4 years and on being diagnosed with a major health condition
within the next 4 years when only limited sets of underwriting controls are included.
Including the most comprehensive set of the life insurance underwriting controls, XLife,
eliminates any information in SRH on the 4 year mortality risk. With respect to the 4
year health risk, however, column 4 of table 1.9 presents evidence that at least for men
some information remains in SRH even when the set of individual health insurance
controls, XIndividualHI , is included. SRH thus may contain more information in the
shorter term.
In the upper panel of table 1.10 results are reported with subjective life expectancy
replacing SRH in equation (1.1) as proxy for private information.8 Subjective life
expectancy is only available in ELSA starting from wave 1. The earliest wave that
contains subjective life expectancy and objectively measured health data is wave 2. I
thus use wave 2 as baseline in this robustness analysis. The dependent variables are
whether an individual is dead by 2008 and whether an individual reports a diagnosis
or recurrence of heart disease, cancer or stroke in wave 3. As wave 2 was elicited in
2006, the time horizon within which the risks can materialize is 2 years.
For means of comparison results using SRH in the 2006 wave of ELSA as proxy
for individual information are reported in the lower panel of table 1.10. Columns 1
and 2 report average marginal effects on the probability of being dead in 2008 for
men and women, respectively, columns 3 and 4 report average marginal effects on
the probability of being diagnosed with heart disease, cancer, or stroke for the two
genders. Only results with the most comprehensive sets of additional control variables
are presented in order to gauge how much private information there is in the case of
stringent underwriting.
The results presented in the upper panel of table 1.10 indicate that subjective life
expectancy contains information on whether individuals die or survive the next 2 years
even when a comprehensive set of additional controls is included. Column 3 and 4
present evidence that there is no significant information in subjective life expectancy
for an onset of a major health condition within the next 2 years. SRH in 2006, on
the contrary, contains information on dying in the next two years only for men and
on the onset of a major health condition for both genders. These results suggest that
subjective life expectancy contains more information on mortality risks, while SRH is
8Subjective life expectancy in ELSA is elicited with the question “What are the chances that you
will live to be x or more?” Where x depends on the individual’s age at the time of the interview. The
average time horizon for this question in the estimation sample is 15 years.
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Table 1.10: Robustness – Subjective Life Expectancy
Mortality Risk Health Risk
Men Women Men Women
1 2 3 4
Subjective Life Expectancy
Probability of surviving – 0− 24% -.032 .004 .049 .028
(.020) (.014) (.037) (.036)
Probability of surviving – 50− 74% -.056*** -.023** -.019 .008
(.019) (.012) (.030) (.029)
Probability of surviving – 75− 100% -.054*** -.017 -.016 -.025
(.020) (.014) (.031) (.030)
Wald test (p-value) 0.003 0.0156 0.0968 0.1358
N 2,136 2,504 1,909 2,315
Pseudo R2 0.3073 0.2814 0.2472 0.2838
Self-Rated Health
SRH – bad/fair .046*** .010 .027 .071***
(.016) (.009) (.028) (.024)
SRH – very good -.011 -.012 -.026 .007
(.010) (.007) (.022) (.019)
SRH – excellent .005 -.007 -.060** -.015
(.016) (.011) (.028) (.025)
Wald test (p-value) 0.004 0.1312 0.0920 0.012
N 2,135 2,504 1,908 2,315
Pseudo R2 0.3081 0.2734 0.2464 0.2866
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 - test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Notes: Average marginal effects after probit. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable
whether an individual is dead by the year 2008 for mortality risk, and whether there was an onset
or recurrence of heart disease, cancer and/or stroke for health risk. Explanatory variables are taken
from ELSA wave 2. Reference category of subjective life expectancy is 25-49%. SRH measured on
the US scale in wave 2, good SRH, the middle category, chosen as reference. Control variables in each
estimation are: age splines, smoking information, medical conditions, number of prescription drugs
taken, family health history, and objective health data. Results are weighted to correct for missing
objective health data using weights provided in ELSA.
Do I know more than my body can tell? 31
better suited to predict health risks – at least in the short run. Whether this finding
also holds in the longer term, is subject to additional analyses that will be possible
once a longer follow-up period is available in ELSA.
SRH and subjective life expectancy are only proxies for individual information
on future health risks. Individuals could have information on the insured risks that is
neither included in SRH nor subjective life expectancy nor in the verifiable underwriting
controls. In order to gauge the scope for private information independent of a proxy for
individual information, I estimate probit models where only the underwriting controls
are included
yj∗i = γ
j
0 + γ
j
1Xai + η
j
i (1.2)
yji = I(y
j∗
i > 0).
Xai represents the vectors of the respective most comprehensive sets of underwriting
controls for both dependent variables, yMi and yDi . The better these comprehensive sets
of underwriting controls help to predict the future realization of the insured risk, the
better the insurer will be able to discriminate between risk types based on the collected
information. The less scope thus remains for private information.
In order to analyze how well models explain the variation in binary dependent vari-
ables, often the percent of correctly predicted observations is reported. This approach
involves predicting the probability, P̂ r(yji = 1|Xai), for each individual and choosing
some cutoff above which the researcher assumes that the predicted probability corre-
sponds to predicting a 1 and below which it corresponds to predicting a 0. One can
then calculate how many of the actual ones and how many of the actual zeros are
correctly predicted by the model. It is not clear, however, what the optimal choice of
cutoff is (see Wooldridge, 2010, p. 573f. for a discussion).
In order to avoid the choice of a specific cutoff, I display the distributions of the
predicted probabilities by the values of the actual outcome variable. For example,
figure 1.3 contains the cumulative distribution functions of P̂ r(yDi = 1|Xai) for men
who are still alive in 2008 and for men who are dead by 2008. Figure 1.4 displays the
same for women, and figures 1.5 and 1.6 display the respective cumulative distribution
functions of P̂ r(yMi = 1|Xai) for men and women, respectively.
For any cutoff probability, the figures show how large the share is of individuals
in the two outcome groups with a predicted probability below or above the respective
cutoff. In figure 1.3 with a cutoff at P̂ r(yDi = 1|Xai) = 20%, for example, 80% of men
who are still alive in 2008 have a predicted probability that is lower than the cutoff,
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Figure 1.3: Predicted Probability Death - Men
Figure 1.4: Predicted Probability Death - Women
and 80% of men who are dead by 2008 have a predicted probability that is higher than
the cutoff. If an insurer thus set a cutoff at 20% and treated every individual with a
predicted probability below this cutoff as low risk and every individual with a predicted
probability above this cutoff as high risk, it would correctly classify 80% of men. Figures
1.4 to 1.6 display similar patterns. Based on the underwriting controls it thus seems
to be possible to discriminate rather accurately between individuals who experience an
event in the future and individuals who do not experience the respective event. This
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Figure 1.5: Predicted Probability Major Condition - Men
Figure 1.6: Predicted Probability Major Condition - Women
provides further evidence that there is not a lot of room for private information in the
different insurance markets when stringent underwriting is employed.
Overall, the analyses presented in this section strengthen the intuition that stringent
underwriting helps to reduce private information in the markets for life insurance and
individual health insurance. At least for the individuals’ information on the risks
insured in health insurance markets, SRH seems to be a better proxy than subjective
life expectancy. Furthermore, there is evidence that even independent of the choice
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of a proxy for individuals’ information on their health risks, little scope for private
information remains with stringent underwriting.
1.7 Conclusion
Mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection in different insurance markets stands
in contrast to robust predictions of the existence of adverse selection in theoretical
models. This divergence has engendered research that tries to reconcile theoretical
and empirical results. This chapter focuses on one possible explanation for the mixed
findings in the empirical literature: different scopes of adverse selection in different
insurance markets. In insurance markets in which insurance companies collect a lot of
information about their applicants and use this information for underwriting, private
information might not exist and thus there might be no scope for adverse selection.
In this study, I focus on the markets for life insurance, annuities and health insur-
ance. Private information in these markets is detected by using information in SRH
on dying in the next years and on future diagnoses of diseases. Different verifiable
measures are included as controls in addition to SRH to imitate different types of in-
formation used in underwriting in the different insurance markets. The information
that remains in SRH when the different sets of underwriting controls are included is
interpreted as private information in the different insurance markets.
The analysis employs data from ELSA, one of the rare longitudinal data sets that
provides objectively measured health data. The data set allows to mimic medical
underwriting with greater precision than is typically possible with data from other
population surveys that only include self-reported health information. As thorough
underwriting that includes outcomes of medical examinations is typically conducted
in life insurance markets and private individual health insurance markets, ELSA’s
objectively measured health data is particularly valuable for my analysis.
Dying within the next 10 years is significantly related to SRH at baseline when
only information on age and sex is additionally included in the analysis. When med-
ical information and in particular objectively measured health data are additionally
included, however, the predictive power of SRH for death or survival is considerably
reduced. Similarly, there is significant information in SRH for the diagnosis or recur-
rence of a major health condition in the next 8 years with only limited controls. The
inclusion of medical information reduces the amount of information contained in SRH
to insignificant levels.
Interpreting the remaining information in SRH when underwriting controls are
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included in the analyses as private information, I thus find evidence for private infor-
mation on mortality risk and health risk if insurance companies do not use medical
information for underwriting. When medical underwriting is conducted, however, the
private information and thus the scope for adverse selection is reduced in life insurance
and eliminated in health insurance markets.
These findings can help to reconcile differences in the evidence of adverse selection
between life insurance and annuity markets and between group and individual private
health insurance markets. Only limited information is used for underwriting in group
health insurance and annuity markets and these markets are found to suffer from
adverse selection. In individual health and life insurance markets medical underwriting
is typically performed and there is little evidence for adverse selection in these markets.
Differences in the information used for underwriting in the different markets – partly
resulting from different underwriting regulations – leave different amounts of private
information and thus different scopes for adverse selection.
My results in turn indicate that employing stringent underwriting in group health
insurance and annuity markets could reduce and possibly eliminate adverse selection
in these markets. Recent research finds that adverse selection reduces welfare in the
market for annuities (Einav et al., 2010b) and in health insurance markets (Bundorf
et al., 2008). A question that my analysis cannot answer, however, is how stringent
underwriting would affect overall welfare in these markets. On the one hand, strin-
gent underwriting might increase welfare by eliminating welfare losses resulting from
adverse selection. On the other hand, it might at the same time reduce welfare in
other dimensions. For example, in the case of short-term insurance contracts where
individuals have to buy insurance coverage repeatedly, repeated stringent underwriting
would introduce an additional risk to the existing health-related risks, namely the risk
of becoming a ‘high risk’ in the future. If there is no insurance to insure against this
additional risk, a “welfare loss from incomplete insurance contracts” will arise (Cutler
and Zeckhauser, 2000, p. 627). Whether stringent underwriting increases or decreases
welfare thus depends on the specific institutional setting.
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Appendix: Inverse Probability Weighting
In order to correct for item non-response and attrition I use inverse probability weight-
ing. To correct for the two selection mechanisms simultaneously, I estimate the joint
probability of availability of all objective health measures in wave 0, (h = 1), and no
attrition after wave 0, (a = 1), using a bivariate probit model.
The crucial assumption for consistency with this approach is conditional indepen-
dence
Pr(a = 1, h = 1|y, SRH,XIndividualHI , d) = Pr(a = 1, h = 1|SRH,Z, d)
where Z ⊂ XIndividualHI , and XIndividualHI is the most comprehensive set of under-
writing controls. Z includes all variables in XIndividualHI except for the objectively
measured health data. d is a vector of additionally included control variables.
The conditional independence assumption would be invalidated by the existence
of unobservables that influence both – selection and the outcome y. The variables
included in d thus not only have to be significant predictors of attrition and item non-
response but also have to be related to y in order to attenuate the worry of unobservable
influences. Potential candidates for inclusion in d are health-related variables that are
not used by insurance companies for underwriting and are therefore not included in
the different sets of control variables X.
In my analysis, d includes information on marital status, activity status, race, the
household’s economic situation, survey participation behavior of other survey members
in the same household, the individual’s survey participation behavior in other parts of
the survey in wave 0, and information on the situation during the interview.
Separate bivariate probit models are estimated for men and women. The coefficients
are displayed in table 1.11. Many of the variables included in d significantly affect
selection. Furthermore, the two selection mechanisms are positively correlated for
both genders. An individual who is more likely to stay in the survey is also more likely
to have a nurse visit and a blood sample taken. This could reflect an unobserved liking
for surveys.
The results in table 1.11 are used to predict Pr(a = 1, h = 1|SRH,Z, d) and
Pr(h = 1|SRH,Z, d) for each individual. 1
Pˆ r(a=1,h=1|SRH,Z,d) is used as a weight in
estimation when the dependent variables is an indicator of a diagnosis or reccurence of
a major health condition. Whether an individual dies or not is observed irrespective
of attrition, therefore 1
Pˆ r(h=1|SRH,Z,d) is used as a weight in the estimations for private
information on mortality risk.
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Table 1.11: Selection Mechanisms – Bivariate Probit
Women Men
a h a h
Completed other 0.197 (0.167) 0.377** (0.157) -0.146 (0.202) 0.465*** (0.180)
Partner a=1 2.360*** (0.067) 0.262*** (0.049) 2.468*** (0.071) 0.235*** (0.053)
Partner h=1 -0.154** (0.064) 0.638*** (0.049) -0.112* (0.067) 0.603*** (0.051)
Interviewed alone 0.233*** (0.063) 0.103* (0.055) 0.599*** (0.080) 0.058 (0.064)
HH size -0.064** (0.030) 0.004 (0.026) -0.035 (0.035) 0.009 (0.027)
Rent home -0.050 (0.058) 0.016 (0.052) -0.100 (0.074) -0.131** (0.063)
Married -0.73*** (0.076) -0.245*** (0.067) -0.609*** (0.096) -0.295*** (0.081)
Widowed -0.034 (0.075) -0.006 (0.072) 0.310*** (0.113) 0.081 (0.106)
White 0.118 (0.125) 0.045 (0.115) -0.242 (0.153) 0.023 (0.129)
Retired -0.018 (0.068) 0.016 (0.059) -0.17 (0.213) -0.195 (0.186)
Unemployed 0.623*** (0.235) 0.082 (0.188) -0.484* (0.254) -0.462** (0.221)
Working -0.039 (0.075) 0.036 (0.061) -0.273 (0.200) -0.299* (0.176)
SRH X X X X
Age splines X X X X
Smoking behavior X X X X
Medical conditions X X X X
Service use X X X X
Family history X X X X
Occupational class X X X X
ρ 0.233*** (0.029) 0.149*** (0.035)
N 4,648 3,556
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Coefficients after bivariate probit analysis displayed. Standard errors in parentheses. a is
equal to 1 if an individual is observed at least once after ELSA wave 0, h is equal to 1 if all objectively
measured health variables are observed for an individual.
Chapter 2
Do they know what’s at risk?
Health Risk Perception Among the
Overweight and Obese
2.1 Introduction
Excess body weight is a risk factor for various diseases. In particular, it increases the
risks of type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, several cancers, arthritis, and psycho-
logical problems (Haslam and James, 2005; Dixon, 2010). Today, more than 70% of
US adults are overweight or obese, meaning that they have a Body Mass Index (BMI)
between 25 and 30, or of at least 30, respectively.1 Furthermore, a large share of US
medical expenditures is caused by excess weight (Cawley and Meyerhoefer, 2010).
While the causes of excess body weight are multifactorial, body weight depends on
each individual’s behavior. Individuals can choose how many calories they consume
and whether they engage in activities with high or low calorie expenditure, for example
they can choose whether they are physically active.
Attempts to help individuals lose weight have shown limited success. In a meta-
analysis McTigue et al. (2003) find that various interventions only promoted modest
weight loss. One possible explanation for this is that individuals who carry excess
weight are not aware of the danger that this weight poses to their health. Gregory
et al. (2008) accordingly find that individuals who do not rate their weight as a health
risk are less likely to engage in weight loss activities than individuals who rate their
weight as a health risk.
1The BMI is measured as weight(kg)height2(m2) . Information on overweight and obesity in the US from the
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), 2007/08.
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In this chapter we analyze whether middle-aged individuals in the US with excess
body weight underestimate their personal risks of diabetes, stroke, heart attack, lung
disease, hypertension and arthritis or rheumatism. Health risk perceptions among over-
weight and obese individuals have been studied by Kan and Tsai (2004) and Gregory
et al. (2008). Our analysis contributes to this literature by measuring individual risk
perceptions in a different way. In particular, while Kan and Tsai (2004) and Gregory
et al. (2008) use information on individual risk perception stemming from qualitative
questions, we ask individuals about numerical probabilities of developing different dis-
eases in the future. An advantage of our numerical subjective measures is that they
can be compared to objective probabilities. This allows us to investigate how accurate
individual risk perceptions are.
Our data on subjective disease probabilities comes from the American Life Panel
(ALP), a panel study administered by RAND. In an ongoing survey in the ALP that
went into the field in the summer of 2010 we ask the survey participants to assess
their chances of developing different diseases in the next 5 years on a 0-100 scale.
In the design of these health expectations questions we follow Manski (2004) who also
provides a general assessment of the validity of similar expectation questions in different
domains, such as stock market returns and returns to schooling.
In order to gauge how well individuals are informed about their health risks we
estimate objective probabilities of developing the different diseases in the next 5 years.
In the estimation of these objective disease probabilities we follow Khwaja et al. (2009)
who conduct a similar analysis on risk perception among smokers. More specifically, we
estimate relationships between individual characteristics and future disease onsets in
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Under the assumption that these relationships
are the same in the ALP today as they were in the HRS a few years ago, we use the
estimates from the HRS to predict the probabilities of disease onsets for individuals in
the ALP.
While not the main focus of our analysis, we use the subjective and objective
disease probabilities in the ALP data to replicate the study by Khwaja et al. (2009)
on the accuracy of risk perception among current and former smokers. The results are
presented in the appendix to this chapter. Essentially, we are able to reproduce their
findings that current and former smokers do not underestimate the different health
risks.
Obese individuals in the ALP, on the contrary, underestimate certain health risks.
In particular, we find evidence that obese individuals underestimate the risks of de-
veloping arthritis, diabetes and hypertension within the next 5 years. The results for
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arthritis are robust to changes in the calculation of the objective risks. The risks of
developing other diseases, such as a heart attack or a stroke, however, are significantly
overestimated by the overweight and obese. As the objective risks of developing these
diseases are relatively small on average, even among obese individuals, this overesti-
mation corresponds to results from other studies that find that individuals tend to
overestimate low probability events (see e.g. Lichtenstein et al., 1978).
The significant underestimation of the risks of arthritis, diabetes and hypertension
among the obese indicates that there is a need for health education in this group.
While health education programs targeted at the overweight and obese will probably
not suffice to fully control the obesity epidemic, our results indicate that there is room
for health education programs to help these individuals make better informed lifestyle
choices.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature.
Section 3 describes the two data sets that we use in this analysis. In Section 4 the
empirical methods are explained. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 explores the
robustness of the results, and Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Our analysis is closely related to two strands of literature. The first strand focuses di-
rectly on risk perceptions among the overweight and obese. The second strand analyzes
risk perception among smokers.
The different studies that analyze risk perception among the overweight and obese
focus primarily on the relationship between risk knowledge and the tendency to be
overweight or obese rather than on the accuracy of the risk knowledge. Kan and Tsai
(2004) find that there is a relationship between individuals’ perception of health risks
resulting from excess weight and the tendency to carry excess weight in Taiwanese men.
In particular, men with very high BMI seem to be less aware of obesity-related health
risks. For women, the authors find no relationship between health risk perception
and BMI. Similarly, Gregory et al. (2008) find that overweight and obese adults in
the US who do not perceive their weight as a risk factor are less likely to engage in
weight lowering activities. Furthermore, the authors show that significant fractions of
overweight and obese adults do not agree to the statement that their weight is a health
risk. This suggests a lack of health knowledge on weight as a risk factor. However,
the question that measures health knowledge is targeted at overall health risks and is
thus very general. It does not allow to distinguish between risks of different diseases.
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Moreover, because of the question’s qualitative nature it is not clear how accurate
individual risk perceptions are.
Analyses of risk perception among smokers have focused on the accuracy of the risk
perception. Viscusi (1990) pioneered this type of analysis in economics by comparing
individuals’ assessments of the probability that smokers get lung cancer because they
smoke with objective measures of this probability. His results indicate that smokers
and non-smokers significantly overestimate the risk of lung cancer due to smoking.
Viscusi and Hakes (2008) extend the earlier analysis to the accuracy of individuals’
assessments of the probability that smokers die from lung cancer, heart disease, or any
other illness because they smoke, and to the accuracy of loss in life expectancy due to
smoking. In line with Viscusi’s earlier findings their results indicate that smokers and
non-smokers overestimate the risk of dying from smoking and the years of life lost due
to smoking when compared to the risks of dying from smoking and life years lost as
reported in the medical literature. As smokers overestimate these risks less than non-
smokers, the results are consistent with the idea that higher risk perceptions protect
individuals from smoking.
While Viscusi (1990) and Viscusi and Hakes (2008) study perceptions of general
risks of smoking, i.e. individuals are asked about the risks of a hypothetical smoker,
Schoenbaum (1997) and Khwaja et al. (2009) analyze the accuracy of risk estimates
concerning the individuals’ personal risks. Schoenbaum (1997) compares individual
expectations of reaching age 75 measured in the HRS with actuarial predictions based
on life tables for the groups of never smokers, former smokers, current light smokers,
and current heavy smokers. Heavy smokers are found to significantly overestimate
the probability of reaching age 75, while the other groups have about accurate risk
perceptions. In Khwaja et al. (2009), individual expectations of reaching age 75 and
expectations of getting certain diseases until the age of 75 are compared with individual
objective risk estimates for each event. The objective risk estimates are based on the
relationship between individual characteristics and disease probabilities as estimated
from the HRS. Their results indicate that smokers do not underestimate disease and
mortality risks.
2.3 Data
The analysis in this chapter is based on two data sets. The main analysis is con-
ducted with data from the American Life Panel (ALP) in which we elicited subjective
risk expectations. Data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is used in the
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calculation of objective health risks for individuals in the ALP.
The HRS was started in 1992 as a representative study of the US non-institutiona-
lized population born between 1931 and 1941. Blacks, Hispanics and residents of
Florida were oversampled. Sampling weights are provided to correct for this oversam-
pling. Data was collected every two years since 1992. The last currently available data
is from 2008. In later waves, additional cohorts were added to the HRS. In particu-
lar, in 1998 the “children of depression (CODA)” cohort (born 1924-1930) and the “war
baby” cohort (born 1942-1947) were added to the data. We use the 1992 HRS wave and
follow-up until 2008 to estimate prediction models for onset of diseases for a population
aged 50-62. As a robustness check we also use a later HRS wave as a baseline year in
the risk prediction models. In particular, we use the 1998 wave. The integration of
additional cohorts in this wave allows to focus the analysis on a representative sample
for the same age group (50-62 year-olds) as when the 1992 wave is used as baseline.
The second data source is the American Life Panel (ALP), an internet survey of
about 3,200 American adults administered by RAND (see http://rand.org/labor/
roybalfd/american_life.html for a full description). We implemented a survey in the
ALP that went into the field in July 2010 and is still ongoing. The focus of our survey
lies primarily on eliciting individuals’ subjective expectations of developing certain
diseases in the future. We elicit the expectations as numerical probabilities with the
question “What do you think is the percent chance that you will develop, or re-develop
if you have already been diagnosed with it, the following conditions in the next 5 years
and ever in you lifetime?".2 The question is preceded by a text that explains the
probability scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that there is absolutely no chance, or 0
percent, and 100 means the event is absolutely sure to happen, or 100 percent. Similar
types of questions on survival expectations have proven useful in eliciting subjective
probabilities that have predictive power for actual outcomes (see Hurd, 2009, for a
summary).
In addition to the subjective expectations we elicited information on risk factors
for the specific diseases, including questions on co-morbidities, family history, and
lifestyle. 915 of the surveyed individuals in our sample are between 50 and 62 years
old at the time of the survey. While the ALP is not a representative sample for the US
population, RAND provides weights to make it comparable to the Current Population
2Individuals who report that they have been diagnosed with chronic diseases, such as diabetes
or chronic lung disease, are not asked about their chances of developing the specific conditions. For
conditions that may relapse, like a stroke or a heart attack, all individuals are asked about the chances
independent of their prior history of the disease. In this chapter, we focus on the 5 year risks. In a
follow-up analysis, we plan to also investigate the accuracy of the lifetime risk perceptions.
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Survey. These weights are used in all following analyses.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
HRS 1992 ALP
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Self-rated health
Excellent 0.24 0.43 0.08 0.32
Very Good 0.30 0.47 0.41 0.61
Good 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.58
Fair 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.44
Poor 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.22
BMI
Normal weight (BMI<25) 0.35 0.48 0.27 0.55
Overweight (25≤BMI<30) 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.59
Obese 1 (30≤BMI<35) 0.16 0.37 0.22 0.51
Obese 2 (35≤BMI<40) 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.31
Obese 3 (BMI≥40) 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.33
Smoking Status
Current Smoker 0.27 0.44 0.21 0.50
Former Smoker 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.57
Never Smoker 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.62
Demographics
Age 55.56 3.25 55.55 4.52
White 0.86 0.345 0.84 0.45
Male 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.62
Married 0.74 0.44 0.68 0.57
Education
Less than High School 0.23 0.42 0.06 0.28
High School or equiv 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.58
Some College 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.56
BA or equiv 0.11 0.31 0.20 0.49
More than BA 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.40
N 9,793 906
Notes: Sampling weights used in estimation of means and standard deviations (SD).
In table 2.1 weighted means and standard deviations of relevant health variables,
risk factors and demographics are displayed for individuals aged 50 to 62 in the ALP
data. For means of comparison, descriptives are also displayed for the HRS 1992
sample.
While the HRS and ALP samples seem to be similar in age and sex, there are
differences in BMI categories, smoking status, and education. Less of the individuals
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in the ALP sample are current or former smokers, but more of them are overweight or
obese. These differences align with changes in the prevalence of smoking and obesity
over the last decades. While the fraction of smokers decreased, the fraction of individ-
uals with excess weight increased.3 The individuals in the ALP 2010 are furthermore
on average better educated than the individuals in the HRS in 1992. This could reflect
the steady advance in educational accomplishments in the US.4 For the results of our
analysis the differences in individual characteristics between the samples do not matter
as long as the relationship between the individual characteristics and the probabilities
of developing different diseases in the future are constant over time. We shed light on
the question how strong this assumption is in the aforementioned robustness check in
which we use a later HRS wave as baseline.
The first two columns of table 2.2 display averages and standard errors of the
subjective disease probabilities in the ALP for individuals who are between 50 and
62 years old. For each disease, only individuals are included who do not report ever
having been diagnosed with the respective disease. In addition to the overall averages,
means of the subjective probabilities are shown for the different BMI categories. It can
be observed that the overall means vary between conditions. The means range from
an 8 percent risk of developing lung disease in the next 5 years to a 21 percent risk of
developing arthritis or rheumatism. Furthermore, the average risks vary by categories
of BMI. For example, individuals with a BMI between 30 and 35 on average rate their
risk of diabetes in the next 5 years more than 2 times as high as individuals with a BMI
lower than 25. For none of the conditions, however, there is a clear graded relationship
between average subjective risk and BMI.
2.4 Estimation Methods
In order to evaluate the accuracy of individuals’ subjective beliefs on different risks
we construct objective risks of getting different diseases in the next 5 years for every
individual in the ALP. In a second step, we analyze whether the difference between the
subjective and objective risk is related to the individuals’ BMI.
3See National Center for Health Statistics (2010), page 24ff. for trends in smoking and obesity in
the US.
4The trend in educational attainment can be seen in data from the U.S. Census available at
www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/historical/index.html. The data shows that in
1992 25.7% of the 35 to 55 year old individuals and 14.2% of the individuals aged 55 or above in
the US had finished their education with 4 years of college or more compared to 27.3% of the younger
and 26.4% of the older group in 2009.
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Table 2.2: Subjective and Objective Risk
Subjective Risk Objective Risk
Mean SE Mean SE
Diabetes Total 10.58 0.72 5.34 0.24
BMI<25 7.14 1.04 1.22 0.05
25≤BMI<30 10.45 1.09 3.89 0.08
30≤BMI<35 15.15 2.04 8.79 0.25
35≤BMI<30 10.48 1.64 12.76 0.69
BMI≥40 14.44 3.81 17.62 0.58
Stroke Total 12.37 0.81 1.91 0.06
BMI<25 10.05 1.37 1.41 0.08
25≤BMI<30 11.28 1.06 1.52 0.07
30≤BMI<35 14.88 2.12 2.12 0.12
35≤BMI<40 18.44 3.50 2.47 0.23
BMI≥40 13.37 3.75 4.54 0.40
Lung Disease Total 8.14 0.62 2.55 0.11
BMI<25 7.71 1.21 2.39 0.23
25≤BMI<30 8.70 1.18 2.19 0.14
30≤BMI<35 9.00 1.19 2.70 0.24
35≤BMI<40 6.22 1.32 3.37 0.41
BMI≥40 5.95 1.18 3.84 0.39
Heart Attack Total 13.07 0.79 3.13 0.11
BMI<25 9.90 1.38 1.99 0.17
25≤BMI<30 13.81 1.17 3.07 0.15
30≤BMI<35 14.35 2.06 4.13 0.30
35≤BMI<40 17.07 2.79 4.17 0.50
BMI≥40 14.13 3.19 3.99 0.45
Hypertension Total 11.53 0.94 12.80 0.23
BMI<25 9.00 1.51 9.29 0.11
25≤BMI<30 11.54 1.25 12.47 0.13
30≤BMI<35 11.51 2.14 15.45 0.22
35≤BMI<40 23.06 5.30 18.33 0.35
BMI≥40 15.48 5.43 21.75 0.57
Arthritis Total 21.14 1.37 21.06 0.40
BMI<25 23.16 2.57 15.63 0.38
25≤BMI<30 20.32 2.13 19.44 0.33
30≤BMI<35 19.84 2.64 23.85 0.53
35≤BMI<40 19.58 4.85 30.04 1.01
BMI≥40 22.77 8.17 37.32 1.15
Notes: Individuals in the ALP aged 50-62 who have not been diagnosed with the respective disease
before. Weights used in calculating means and standard errors (SE). Subjective expectation on devel-
oping of arthritis/rheumatism is combination of subjective expectation on arthritis/rheumatism onset
and subjective expectation of rheumatoid arthritis onset (see appendix to this chapter for details).
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2.4.1 Calculation of Objective Risk
For the calculation of the objective risks we use data from the HRS to estimate the
relationship between individual characteristics at a baseline year and the observed
onset of diseases in the future. Similar to Khwaja et al. (2009) we use d, d ∈ {1, ..., D}
duration models to model the relationship between the characteristics and the time
to onset of each disease, d. We assume that the survivor functions follow Weibull
distributions and allow for Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity. The survivor
function for disease d is
S(tdi ;Xi,θ
d, µd|ηdi ) =
(
exp(−λdi (tdi )µ
d
)
)ηdi
(2.1)
where λdi is parameterized as exp(−µdXi′θd) so that the survival distribution is a
Weibull in accelerated failure time (AFT) metric. ηdi stands for the unobserved het-
erogeneity that is Gamma( 1
σd
,σd) distributed. tdi represents the time until individual i
is diagnosed with disease d. If individual i does not report a diagnosis of the disease
within the time that she is observed in the HRS, i is treated as a right-censored ob-
servation. In this case, tdi contains the time to censoring, i.e. the time in which i is
observed.5 µd is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, Xi represents the
vector of individual characteristics and includes information on smoking status, BMI
categories, self-rated health, age, sex, educational degree, marital status, and race. θd
is the corresponding vector of coefficients.
We estimate µd, θd, and σd by maximum likelihood. Based on these parameter
estimates, we calculate each individual i’s probability of not getting disease d in the
next t years as
Ôdi (t;Xi, θˆ
d
, µˆd) = Eη
(
Ôdi (t;Xi, θˆ
d
, µˆd|ηˆd)
)
=
[
1 + σˆdexp(−µˆdXi′θˆd)tµˆd
]− 1
σˆd (2.2)
Naturally, the probability of getting the disease within the next t years is then
O˜di = 1− Ôdi (t;Xi, θˆ
d
, µˆd). (2.3)
As the time horizon of the subjective risk is 5 years, we set t = 5.
We have to make two main assumptions to use the estimated relationship for the
5The time to disease onset, tdi , is measured in years. A report of a new diagnosis in wave A is coded
as the time in years between wave 1 and wave A minus 1. As there are two years between consecutive
waves, tdi is coded as 5, for example, in the case of a new report of a disease d by individual i in wave 4.
For right-censored observations tdi is measured in years between 1992 and the year of the observation
i’s last interview.
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calculation of the objective risks in the ALP. As above-mentioned, we assume that the
relationships between the characteristics and disease onsets stay constant over time
and thus are the same in the ALP today as they were in the HRS. This assumption is
evaluated by using different HRS waves as baseline years in robustness analyses.
Furthermore, we assume that the development of the different diseases is accurately
captured by the reports of the diagnoses of the diseases in the HRS. This assumption
might fail for at least two different reasons. On the one hand, individuals might be
unaware of having a disease and therefore do not report it in the HRS. In particular, two
of the diseases focused on in this study, diabetes and hypertension, are conditions that
tend to remain undiagnosed, because they are often asymptomatic (Chatterji et al.,
2010). On the other hand, individuals might misreport diseases for other reasons
than unawareness, for example to justify non-participation in the labor market (Baker
et al., 2004). Up to now, we do not further analyze the consequences that potential
misreporting has for our results.
2.4.2 Comparison Subjective and Objective Risk
In the next step, we compare the subjective and the objective disease risks. Following
Khwaja et al. (2009), we regress the difference between the subjective probability and
the objective probability on the different BMI categories with normal- or underweight
as reference
Sdi − O˜di = γd0 + γd1OVi + γd2OB1i + γd3OB2i + γd4OB3i + di (2.4)
where Sdi indicates the subjective risk of developing disease d within the next 5 years,
OV is a dummy for having a BMI between 25 and 30, and OB1, OB2, and OB3
stand for the 3 categories of obesity, 30 ≤ BMI < 35, 35 ≤ BMI < 40, and BMI≥ 40,
respectively. If γd0 is significantly positive, individuals who are normal- or underweight
significantly overestimate their risk of developing disease d. Significantly positive es-
timates for γd2 , γd3 or γd4 indicate that in the respective group the difference between
subjective and objective risk is on average larger than among the normal- or under-
weight individuals. Individuals in group k on average underestimate their risk of disease
d if γd0 + γdk is significantly smaller than 0.
In addition to these simple comparisons of means between the groups, we include
information on income and education in equation (2.4) to analyze whether differences
in these socio-economic characteristics can explain differences in the accuracy of risk
perception between different BMI groups.
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2.5 Results
Table 2.3 reports coefficients and standard errors after estimation of the model spec-
ified in equation (2.1) for the different diseases. As the models are specified in ac-
celerated failure time metric, a positive coefficient indicates that the time to disease
onset increases with the associated variable, i.e. the risk decreases with the variable.
Conversely, a negative coefficient indicates that the risk increases with an increase in
the associated variable. The risks of all diseases except diabetes and hypertension
significantly increase with age. The disease risks are higher for worse assessments of
self-rated health, and they increase with smoking and BMI categories. Lower educated
individuals are at higher risk for diabetes, lung disease and hypertension, and men are
at higher risk for diabetes, stroke and a heart attack, while women have a higher risk
of arthritis or rheumatism.
Based on the estimates in table 2.3, objective disease risks for the individuals in the
ALP are calculated according to equations (2.2) and (2.3). The last two columns of
table 2.2 report the average objective probabilities and standard errors for the sample of
50-62 year-olds in the ALP. Averages of objective probabilities are also displayed for the
different categories of BMI. The average objective risks show a clear graded relationship
with BMI. All disease risks are on average higher for higher BMI categories.
Table 2.4 reports results of the estimation of equation (2.4) for the different diseases.
The first column of results for each disease reports estimates when only indicators for
the different BMI categories are included as explanatory variables. In the reference
category, i.e. among individuals who have a BMI smaller than 25, the subjective
probabilities of all disease onsets but hypertension are on average significantly larger
than the respective objective probabilities. Normal- and underweight individuals, for
example, overestimate the risk of being diagnosed with diabetes within the next 5 years
by 5.9 percentage points on average. For the other diseases the overestimation ranges
from 5.3 percentage points for lung disease to 8.6 percentage points for stroke.
The results for the overweight and obese individuals are mixed for the different
diseases. Similar to the normal- and underweight, they seem to correctly asses their
risk of hypertension and overestimate the risks of a stroke, a heart attack, and the
onset of chronic lung disease within the next 5 years. The risk of diabetes is also
overestimated by the overweight and mildly obese (30≤BMI<35). The two highest
BMI categories, however, seem to assess their risk accurately on average. In these
two categories, the sum of the group’s coefficient and the constant is not significantly
different from 0.
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As the objective risks of most diseases for the normal- and underweight and of
chronic lung disease, heart attack and stroke among the overweight and obese are
relatively small on average, the general pattern of overestimation is in line with other
results in the literature according to which individuals tend to overestimate small
probability events (Lichtenstein et al., 1978). As diabetes risk increases significantly
for the higher BMI groups, this might also explain why obese individuals have on
average more accurate assessments of their risks of diabetes than the normal- and
underweight.
Interestingly the results in table 2.4 suggest that obese individuals underestimate
one health risk, namely the risk of developing arthritis or rheumatism in the next 5
years. On average, individuals with a BMI between 35 and 40 underestimate the risk
by 10 percentage points and individuals in the highest BMI group underestimate the
risk by about 15 percentage points.
The coefficients in the second column for each disease in table 2.4 result from
estimation of equation (2.4) with information on an individual’s educational attainment
and on household income included in addition to indicators of BMI categories. The
results are essentially unchanged. Neither differences in educational attainment nor
differences in income can thus explain the underestimation of arthritis risk among the
obese.
2.6 Robustness Analyses
In this section, we present several robustness analyses. First, we use estimates based
on a later HRS wave to calculate the objective risks in the ALP. Second, we employ
probit models instead of duration models to estimate the relationship between indi-
vidual characteristics and disease onset in the HRS. Third, we report estimates using
the relative difference between subjective and objective risk instead of the absolute
difference as dependent variable.
The upper panel of table 2.5 displays coefficients and standard errors after esti-
mation of equation (2.4) where the objective risk measure is based on HRS 1998 and
follow-up instead of on the first HRS wave.6 In order to ensure comparability to the
main analysis, only individuals aged 50-62 from the HRS 1998 are used to estimate
model (2.1). Using a later cohort in the HRS as baseline helps us to investigate whether
6The latest available wave that allows 5 years follow-up is wave 6, elicited in 2002. When infor-
mation from this wave and follow-up is used, results are qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged
from the ones displayed in the upper panel of table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Robustness Analyses I
Diabetes Stroke Lung Disease Heart Attack Hypertension Arthritis
Objective Risk based on duration model with HRS 1998 and follow-up
Overweight (25≤BMI<30) -0.005 0.009 0.014 0.034* -0.049** -0.042
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.02 ) (0.033)
Obese 1 (30≤BMI<35) -0.022 0.046* 0.01 0.033 -0.075*** -0.139***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) (0.037)
Obese 2 (35≤BMI<40) -0.134*** 0.059 -0.025 0.056* 0.008 -0.193***
(0.023) (0.037) (0.018) (0.033) (0.053) (0.054)
Obese 3 (BMI≥40) -0.128*** 0.007 -0.055*** 0.02 -0.062 -0.236***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.018) (0.036) (0.053) (0.083)
Constant 0.055*** 0.083*** 0.048*** 0.076*** -0.041*** 0.053**
(0.01) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.026)
N 779 861 828 861 536 585
R2 0.0643 0.0136 0.018 0.0101 0.0326 0.0668
Objective Risk based on probit model with HRS 1992 and follow-up
Overweight (25≤BMI<30) -0.002 0.014 0.018 0.03 -0.035* -0.067**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033)
Obese 1 (30≤BMI<35) -0.028 0.04 0.007 0.015 -0.078*** -0.114***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025) (0.027) (0.037)
Obese 2 (35≤BMI<40) -0.128*** 0.078** -0.027 0.042 0.02 -0.221***
(0.027) (0.037) (0.018) (0.032) (0.055) (0.057)
Obese 3 (BMI≥40) -0.177*** 0.007 -0.014 0.029 -0.186*** -0.332***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.017) (0.036) (0.06) (0.084)
Constant 0.06*** 0.083*** 0.046*** 0.073*** -0.011 0.037
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.026)
N 779 861 828 861 536 585
R2 0.083 0.0151 0.0089 0.0067 0.0789 0.0899
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are differences between individual sub-
jective and objective risks. Each estimation is based on individuals in the ALP aged 50-62 without a
diagnosis of the specific condition prior to the ALP interview. Results weighted to take into account
sample selection. Subjective expectation on the onset of arthritis is combination of subjective expec-
tation on arthritis/rheumatism onset and subjective expectation of rheumatoid arthritis onset (see
appendix to this chapter for details).
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and how changes in the relationship between individual characteristics and disease on-
set over time affect our results. Two important differences compared to the main results
emerge. First, obese individuals do not only underestimate the risk of arthritis, but
also the risk of diabetes. Second, the risk of being diagnosed with hypertension in
the next 5 years is significantly underestimated among all BMI categories on average.
The underestimation of the risk of hypertension is especially pronounced among the
overweight and mildly obese.
As the measures of disease onset in the HRS rely on self-reports instead of for
example on results from a medical examination, these results could reflect a general
trend in the reduction of the number of undiagnosed cases of diabetes and hypertension
over time.7 Furthermore, an increased awareness of the health problems related to
obesity might have made diagnoses of diabetes and hypertension particularly more
likely among the higher BMI group. This could explain why the calculated objective
risks of hypertension and diabetes are higher for the higher BMI categories when they
are based on later HRS waves.
Table 2.6: Robustness Analyses II
Diabetes Stroke Lung Disease Heart Attack Hypertension Arthritis
Overweight (25≤BMI<30) -3.265*** 0.401 0.479 -2.112 -0.050 -0.459**
(0.884) (1.752) (1.184) (1.445) (0.184) (0.216)
Obese 1 (30≤BMI<35) -4.260*** -0.621 0.493 -3.834*** -0.190 -0.684***
(0.875) (1.912) (1.338) (1.452) (0.218) (0.211)
Obese 2 (35≤BMI<40) -5.199*** 1.799 -2.216** -2.000 0.314 -0.869***
(0.851) (3.327) (1.058) (2.029) (0.332) (0.239)
Obese 3 (BMI≥40) -5.182*** -3.525 -2.733*** -2.569 -0.274 -0.929***
(0.872) (2.994) (1.008) (2.112) (0.279) (0.273)
Constant 5.058*** 7.864*** 3.564*** 7.231*** -0.036 0.509***
(0.840) (1.505) (0.922) (1.318) (0.159) (0.180)
N 779 861 828 861 536 585
R2 0.0779 0.006 0.01 0.0126 0.0084 0.043
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are differences between individual sub-
jective and objective risk relative to the objective risk of each disease. Each estimation is based on
individuals in ALP aged 50-62 without respective condition at time of interview. Results weighted
to take into account sample selection. Subjective expectation on the onset of arthritis is combination
of subjective expectation on arthritis/rheumatism onset and subjective expectation of rheumatoid
arthritis onset (see appendix to this chapter for details).
Results using objective risk estimates based on probit models instead of duration
7See Smith (2007) for the development of undiagnosed diabetes over time and Cutler et al. (2008b)
for the development of undiagnosed hypertension.
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models are presented in the lower panel of table 2.5. Instead of the time to disease on-
set as the dependent variable, we use an indicator variable that takes on the value one
if an individual is diagnosed with the specific condition sometime before the 4th wave
of the HRS and is zero otherwise. The results confirm conclusions drawn in the main
analysis. Obese individuals underestimate the risk of arthritis or rheumatism. More-
over, there is evidence that the obese are overly optimistic about their risks of diabetes
and hypertension, as they also underestimate the risks of the latter two diseases.
Table 2.6 reports results when the deviation of the subjective risk from the objective
risk is measured relative to the objective risk. Instead of the difference in levels, we
use the difference relative to the objective risk, S
d
i −O˜di
O˜di
, as dependent variable in model
(2.4). The results are again similar to the results of the main analysis. Individuals
who are normal- or underweight overestimate the risks of most diseases significantly.
As the percent rather than percentage point metric puts an emphasis on deviations
from smaller objective values, it comes at no surprise that there are overestimations
between 350 and almost 800% for the diseases that show relatively low risks among
normal- and underweight individuals. The risk of hypertension is not overestimated
and the risk of arthritis is overestimated by about 50% among the normal- and under-
weight. Importantly, despite putting relatively less emphasis on deviations from higher
objective risks, we find evidence that individuals who are obese underestimate their
risk of arthritis or rheumatism. Individuals with a BMI between 35 and 40 underesti-
mate the risk by about 36% and individuals with a BMI over 40 underestimate their
risk by 42%.
Overall, the robustness analyses confirm our main findings that obese individuals
underestimate the 5-year risk of arthritis or rheumatism. Furthermore, this section
provides evidence suggesting that also the risks of hypertension and diabetes are un-
derestimated by individuals with excess body weight.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we add to the literature on risk perception among the overweight and
obese by comparing subjective probabilities of developing different diseases within the
following 5 years to objective probabilities of the same events. Our results indicate that
individuals who are normal- or underweight overestimate most disease risks. Similarly,
the overweight tend to overestimate their risks. Obese individuals, however, under-
estimate the risks of arthritis or rheumatism, diabetes and hypertension, while they
overestimate the risks of heart attack and stroke.
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These results are important for at least two reasons. First, diabetes and hyperten-
sion are silent conditions that often do not show symptoms. Therefore they risk to
remain undiagnosed. When undiagnosed the conditions cannot be treated adequately
and are thus likely more harmful. Individuals who underestimate the risks of these
conditions might also be less likely to get checked for the conditions. The conditions
might therefore remain undiagnosed longer, causing greater harm and higher medical
expenses than if they were treated correctly.
Second, the results can provide guidance for designing health education programs
targeted at the obese. While the medium term risks of cardiovascular disease, and
in particular heart attack and stroke, is on average not underestimated by the obese,
there is evidence that the risks of diabetes, hypertension and arthritis are not well
understood. Increasing the awareness of these risks among the obese might allow them
to make better informed lifestyle choices and help them to opt for a more healthy
lifestyle.
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Appendix
Results for smokers
In order to compare our results directly with the results of Khwaja et al. (2009), we
estimate an equation similar to equation (2.4) where instead of the dummies for the
BMI categories dummies for former and current smokers are included. Results are
displayed in table 2.7. Despite some differences in the estimation method, the time
horizon and in the data used, our results support the findings by Khwaja et al. (2009).
Neither current nor former smokers robustly underestimate any of the analyzed disease
risks.
Subjective Expectations on Arthritis/Rheumatism
Subjective expectations on developing arthritis or rheumatism in the future are elicited
by two separate questions in the ALP. The first question asks individuals about their
chances of developing arthritis or rheumatism except rheumatoid arthritis, Pr(arthr),
and the second question asks about the chances of developing rheumatoid arthritis,
Pr(RA). In the HRS, however, there is only information on arthritis and rheumatism
including rheumatoid arthritis. We therefore combine the answers to the two subjective
expectations question in the ALP.
As we are interested in whether overweight and obese individuals underestimate
their risks of developing different diseases, we aggregate the two probabilities in a way
that results in the largest possible subjective probability of developing arthritis. In
particular, we set
Pr(arthritis) = min{100;Pr(arthr) + Pr(RA)} (2.5)
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneous Effects of Copayments:
A Finite Mixture Bivariate Probit
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Analyses of reforms have traditionally focused on average effects. Average effects are
helpful, for example, in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a reform. A comparison of
the average returns generated by a reform to the average costs of the reform suffices to
draw conclusions on cost-effectiveness. The average effect, however, might hide details
that are important for an overall evaluation of a reform. When the average effect is
positive, for example, but it is a combination of positive effects for most individuals and
large negative effects for a few, this is likely of interest to the policy maker. Depending
on the policy maker’s objective function, the harm to the few might be more important
than the gains for the many. It is therefore important to analyze whether a reform
affected different individuals differently.
In this paper, we develop and apply a finite mixture bivariate probit model that
allows to simultaneously analyze two types of effect heterogeneities. On the one hand,
the finite mixture component of the model allows to estimate different reform effects
for different latent classes of individuals. More specifically, it is assumed that there are
different classes or groups of individuals in the population, but that it is unobserved
which individual belongs to which group. The observations within each group are
assumed to be generated by the same distribution function. Between groups, however,
any parameters of the distribution are allowed to vary. In the context of evaluating
a reform, the model allows for as many distinct reform effects as there are groups of
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individuals; within each group individuals are assumed to be affected in the same way.
On the other hand, the bivariate probit component of the model allows to jointly
estimate the effect on two distinct binary outcomes. The combination of the finite
mixture and the bivariate probit component permits to study effects on the two binary
outcomes within each of the latent classes at the same time. To our best knowledge,
these two heterogeneities have up to now only been investigated under the assumption
of independence between the errors of the two outcome equations (Atella et al., 2004).
In our model, this independence assumption is relaxed.
We apply the model to analyze heterogeneities in the effect of an increase of copay-
ments for doctor visits and prescription drugs in the German statutory health insurance
in 2004. The most radical element of the reform was an introduction of a per-quarter
fee for doctor visits. Since 2004 patients have to pay e 10 for the first visit to a physi-
cian in each quarter of the year. Further doctor visits to the same doctor within the
quarter are free of charge for the patient. Visits in the same quarter to other doctors
are also exempt from the fee if the patient gets a referral by the doctor whom he visited
at first.
The literature that focuses on the effect of this specific reform delivers mixed results.
Augurzky et al. (2006) and Schreyögg and Grabka (2010) find that the reform had
essentially no effect on the health care use of the statutorily insured in the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Using the same data set Farbmacher (2010), on the
contrary, presents evidence according to which the reform had an effect on the health
care use of the statutorily insured. Farbmacher’s results are in line with Rückert
et al. (2008) who find that individuals surveyed in the Bertelsmann Healthcare Monitor
report avoiding and delaying doctor visits due to the per-quarter fee. Our contributions
to this literature are twofold. We use a new data set to study the effect of the reform.
In addition, our study is the first that analyzes whether this reform had heterogeneous
effects.
The data set that is employed in this analysis stems from insurance claims of the
largest German sickness fund. It includes information on doctor visits two years before
and two years after the reform. An advantage of using insurance claims data is that
doctor visits are reliably observed. We observe every doctor visit irrespective of whether
a patient paid the per-quarter fee. Furthermore, the data includes information on
different types of doctor visits. In particular, it comprises information on visits to
general practitioners (GPs) and on visits to specialists. This allows us to analyze
whether the reform had differential effects on these two types of doctor visits. A
disadvantage of the data is, however, that besides age and sex it does not contain any
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socio-demographic information.
Furthermore, the data set only includes few individuals who are exempt from the
copayments and could thus serve as a control group. We therefore apply a before-after
comparison. Our results rely on the assumption that in the absence of the reform
there would not have been any changes in health care use. In the two years before and
two years after the introduction of the copayments there were no other reforms in the
German health care system.
In our analysis, we focus on the question whether the increase of the copayments
in 2004 had an effect on the probability to visit a GP and/or a specialist at least once
within a year. We focus on the probability of visiting a doctor instead of on the number
of doctor visits within that period, because the reform should mainly affect access to
health care. The e 10 fee only has to be paid for the first visit in a quarter. The price
for additional doctor visits in the same quarter is therefore essentially zero.
Our results indicate that the average probability of at least one doctor visit, irre-
spective of the doctor’s type, is 3 percentage points lower in the years after the reform
than in the years before the reform. The results are in line with Rückert et al. (2008)
and Farbmacher (2010) and indicate that the reform affected the access to health care.
Furthermore, we find evidence for both of the analyzed heterogeneities. When
allowing for two latent classes, the reform has a much stronger effect on individuals in
one of the latent classes. The more affected class only comprises 24% of individuals.
The two groups can be characterized by their probability of health care use prior to
the reform. The larger group has a probability of seeing at least one doctor per year
that is almost 100%, we thus call them the likely users. The smaller group only goes
to see a doctor with a probability of 66%. We call them the less-likely users. As the
likely users react less to the reform than the less-likely users our results are in line with
findings by Bago d’Uva (2006) and Winkelmann (2006) who present evidence that high
users of health care are less sensitive to increases in coinsurance and copayments than
low users.
In addition, we find evidence that the two groups react differently for the two types
of doctor visits. Among the likely users the probability of seeing a GP is not affected
by the reform. The probability of seeing a specialist, however, decreases after the
reform in this group. For the less-likely users, on the contrary, the probabilities of
both types of doctor visits decline significantly after the reform. For a large group of
individuals the introduction of the per-quarter fee might thus have strengthened the
GP’s function as a gatekeeper in the health care system, even though the reform did
not force individuals to focus on GP visits only. Our results thus provide evidence that
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it might be possible to strengthen the GP’s function as a gatekeeper without actually
limiting individuals’ choices directly.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our finite mixture bivari-
ate probit model, the data used in the analysis is described in Section 3. Section 4
presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Econometric Framework
Our data consists of a panel of individuals across time and across different physician
types. The patient can seek care from GPs (y1it) and/or specialists (y2it). The panel is
unbalanced over time, and each individual i is observed in Ti periods. Over time and
physician types, individual i is thus observed 2 · Ti. Suppose that individual i belongs
to a latent class j for the entire observational period. The probability of belonging to
class j is pij. Within a latent class, we use bivariate probits to jointly model the decision
to visit a GP and/or a specialist. The joint probability of the dependent variables over
the observed period is the product of Ti independent probabilities, given fixed class
membership, i.e.,
Pr(y1i, y2i|xi, θj) =
Ti∏
t=1
Φ2[(2y1it − 1)xitβj, (2y2it − 1)xitγj, (2y1it − 1)(2y2it − 1)ρj](3.1)
where xi denotes the vector of covariates. θj contains the vector of parameters for
GP visits (βj), for specialist visits (γj), and in addition the parameter ρj. The latter
parameter indicates the extent to which the errors in the underlying structural model
covary.
The log-likelihood function is given by
ln(L) =
I∑
i=1
ln
(
J∑
j=1
pijPr(y1i, y2i|xi, θj)
)
(3.2)
where I is the number of individuals in the dataset and J is the number of latent
classes. The likelihood function is maximized using the Newton-Raphson algorithm.
First and second derivatives are calculated numerically in Stata’s optimization package.
Our finite mixture bivariate probit model is similar to the model developed by
Atella et al. (2004). We expand their model by a panel dimension and thus use addi-
tional information to determine class membership. While Atella et al. (2004) impose a
correlation of zero between the errors of the two outcome equations, we estimate these
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correlations for each latent class. As the dependent variables are visits to different
types of physicians, the latter extension seems to be of particular importance.
For the interpretation of our results we calculate marginal effects on the marginal
and joint outcome probabilities. Standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated
using the delta method.1
3.3 Data
The analysis is based on insurance claims data from the largest German sickness fund
in the years 2002 to 2005. The original data contains information on a 18.75% random
subsample of all individuals in the German state of Hesse who are insured with this
sickness fund.2 We only include individuals in our analysis who are at least 19 years
old, as younger individuals are exempt from the copayments.3 Our sample is further
restricted to all individual-year pairs for which we observe the use of medical services
within the entire year. Individual-year pairs, for example, in years within which an
individual switches from or to a different insurer or dies are excluded. This gives us the
same period at risk for each observation. Furthermore, in order to get a manageable
data set for our statistical analyses, we restrict the sample to a 3% random subsample.
This gives us a sample with on average a little more than 7,000 individuals per year.
The data contains information on age and sex in addition to the information on
health care use. Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the different years. The
average age is almost unchanged over time. This reflects that we use an unbalanced
panel of individuals. The average number of doctor visits in our sample is almost 19
per year. On average individuals visit a GP a little less than once a month and a
specialist around 7 times per year. This in international comparison relatively high
use of physician services is in line with information from other data on doctor visits in
Germany. The average number of doctor visits in another large German wide sickness
fund, for example, is only slightly lower with 16.4 in 2004 and 16.9 in 2005 (Grobe
et al., 2010).
While the average number of doctor visits per year does not change after the reform,
at least one possible effect of the increased copayments becomes evident in table 3.1:
Between 2003 and 2004, the fraction of individuals with at least one GP visit and the
1See appendix for details.
2See http://www.pmvforschungsgruppe.de/content/02_forschung/02_b_sekundaerd_1.htm for a
short description of the data in German.
3This feature of the reform suggests a natural devision in treatment and control group. We conduct
a difference-in-difference analysis for teenagers in a follow-up analysis.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
2002 2003 2004 2005
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 52.35 18.55 52.47 18.66 52.58 18.64 52.49 18.72
19-39 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
40-59 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47
60-79 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46
≥ 80 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26
Female 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50
# GP visits 11.56 13.87 11.42 14.22 11.71 14.61 11.90 15.56
GP>0 0.83 0.38 0.83 0.38 0.81 0.40 0.81 0.40
# GP visits truncated at 0 13.95 14.10 13.84 14.54 14.52 14.96 14.76 16.06
# Specialist visits 7.10 11.09 7.16 11.19 6.84 11.40 7.01 11.21
Specialist>0 0.73 0.46 0.72 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46
# Specialist visits truncated at 0 9.77 11.97 9.89 12.09 9.75 12.53 10.1 12.24
N 7,228 7,107 7,024 7,037
fraction with at least one specialist visit both decline by about 2 percentage points,
from 83% to 81% for GPs and from 72% to 70% for specialists. Individuals thus seem
to avoid to contact either type of doctor after the reform. There is also weak evidence
that the pattern of use might change after the reform. There are slightly more GP,
and slightly less specialist visits in 2004 compared to 2003.
Figure 3.1: Development of GP and Specialist Visits Over Time
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As the copayments can only be avoided by seeing neither type of physician, we
are also interested in the different combinations of the outcome variables, i.e. whether
an individual visited both types of doctors at least once, or only one of the two, or
neither. Figure 3.1 shows the development over time of the fractions of individuals
who had different combination of doctor visits in the different years. While in 2002
and 2003, roughly 10% of the sample visit neither a GP nor a specialist, this is the
case for about 12% of individuals in the years after the reform. The increase in the
fraction of non-visitors is accompanied by small decreases in the other three fractions.
3.4 Results
In order to compare the results of the finite mixture bivariate probit model with results
from models that just focus on average effects, and from models that analyze only one
of the two heterogeneities we estimate several models in addition to the one described
in section 3.2. In particular, we estimate a single equation probit model where the
dependent variable combines the information on the two types of doctor visits to com-
pare our results to others in the literature. We integrate a finite mixture component
with two latent classes into this model to allow for different effects in different latent
classes.
Furthermore, differential effects on the two types of doctor visits are analyzed in a
bivariate probit model. This model is estimated imposing a correlation of 0 between the
error terms of the two underlying equations and relaxing this assumption. Similarly,
when integrating the finite mixture component in the bivariate probit context, we
estimate the model imposing a zero correlation and relaxing this assumption. We do
this in order to investigate whether our model improves upon the one presented by
Atella et al. (2004).
3.4.1 Model Selection
Table 3.2 reports AIC and BIC information criteria for the different models. As the
single equation probit models use a different dependent variable than the bivariate
probit models, the information criteria cannot be compared between the upper and
the lower part of the table. Within the lower and upper part, however, the information
in table 3.2 can help to select the model that fits the data best. In general, the table
indicates that models with two latent classes fit the data better than models that do
not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Restricting ρ to zero in the bivariate models
leads to a deterioration of model fit in both, the degenerate and the finite mixture case.
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Among the models in the lower part of table 3.2, the finite mixture bivariate probit
model that allows for correlation between the error terms within each class shows the
best fit according to the AIC and BIC information criteria.
Table 3.2: Model Selection
Model N LogL df AIC BIC
Probit Visit 28,396 -9748.09 9 19514.18 19588.47
FMM Probit Visit 28,396 -7729.19 19 15496.39 15653.21
Bivariate Probit (ρ = 0) 28,396 -29567.2 18 59170.4 59318.97
Bivariate Probit (ρ unrestricted) 28,396 -28076.14 19 56190.28 56347.1
FMM Bivariate Probit (ρj = 0) 28,396 -24966.48 37 50006.96 50312.36
FMM Bivariate Probit (ρj unrestricted) 28,396 -24887.91 39 49853.83 50175.74
Notes: Visit combines information on GP and specialists visits into one variable that is one if either
type of doctor has been visited at least once.
3.4.2 Average Effects and one-way Heterogeneities
For means of comparison we begin with reporting the average marginal effects and
standard errors of the single equation probit models and the simple bivariate probit
model with unrestricted ρ in table 3.3. The first two columns display average marginal
effects on the probability of at least one doctor visit per year, irrespective of the
physician type visited. The remainder of table 3.3 reports results with the two types
of heterogeneities introduced independently of each other. Columns 3 to 6 of table
3.3 report results for two latent classes in the single equation probit. The average
marginal effects and standard errors displayed in columns 7 and 8 are based on the
bivariate probit model where the dependent variable is split to distinguish between the
probability to visit a GP and the probability to visit a specialist.
All estimations show significant changes in the probability of seeing a doctor after
the increase of the copayments at the beginning of the year 2004. Marginal effects
reported in column 1 of table 3.3 indicate that the probability of at least one doctor
visit per year is 3 percentage points lower in 2004 and 2005 compared to 2002.
This overall effect hides heterogeneous reform effects in both analyzed dimensions.
The finite mixture probit model reveals that individuals in the two latent classes react
differently to the reform. The estimate of the prior probability, pi1, of belonging to latent
class 1 is 0.89%. In this larger fraction of the sample the probability of at least one
doctor visit only decreases by 1.9 percentage points in 2004 and 2.6 percentage points
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Table 3.3: Marginal Effects after Probit, FMM Probit and Bivariate Probit
Probit FMM Probit Bivariate Probit
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
ME SE ME SE ME SE ME SE
Pr(Visit>0) Pr(Visit>0) Pr(Visit>0) Pr(GP>0)
Female 0.060*** 0.006 0.039*** 0.003 0.120*** 0.023 0.043*** 0.007
Age Splines
Age 19-40 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001 0.0003 -0.001 0.002 0.0002 0.001
Age 40-60 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.0004 0.004 0.004*** 0.001
Age 60-80 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.001 -0.0003 0.004 0.001 0.001
Age > 80 -0.004 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.016** 0.008 -0.004 0.003
Year Dummies
2003 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.032 0.027 -0.004 0.004
2004 -0.032*** 0.004 -0.019*** 0.004 -0.138*** 0.027 -0.019*** 0.005
2005 -0.034*** 0.004 -0.026*** 0.004 -0.099*** 0.028 -0.019*** 0.005
Pr(Specialist>0)
Female 0.159*** 0.008
Age Splines
Age 19-40 -0.001* 0.001
Age 40-60 0.006*** 0.001
Age 60-80 -0.006*** 0.001
Age > 80 -0.011*** 0.003
Year Dummies
2003 -0.003 0.006
2004 -0.024*** 0.006
2005 -0.030*** 0.006
ρ 0.572 0.011
pi1 0.887
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Marginal Effects on the probability stated at the top of each column. Visit combines
information on GP and specialists visits. pi1 is the probability of class membership in latent class 1.
Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
in 2005. In the other latent class the reaction amounts to 13.8 and 9.9 percentage
point changes in the different years. There, thus, seems to be a rather small group
of individuals who reacted sharply to the reform while the rest only changed behavior
moderately.
The probabilities of different types of doctor visits are also affected differently by
the reform. The results in the last columns of table 3.3 show that the probability of
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seeing a specialist at least once after the reform decreases more than the probability
of seeing a GP. While the probability of seeing a GP at least once decreases by 1.9
percentage points, the probability of seeing a specialist at least once is reduced by 2.4
to 3 percentage points.
3.4.3 Simultaneous Evaluation of Heterogeneities
The finite mixture bivariate probit model allows to simultaneously analyze the two
types of heterogeneities. Table 3.4 presents coefficients, average marginal effects, and
standard errors for the two dependent variables and the two latent classes. The es-
timated prior probability of belonging to latent class 1, pi1, is about 74%. There are
differences in almost all parameter estimates between the two latent classes.
The sharpest difference between the two latent classes arises when focusing on the
changes over time. Probabilities in all other years are again compared to the year 2002
as reference. In latent class 1 only the probability of at least one visit to a specialist in
2005 decreases significantly compared to 2002, all other year parameter estimates are
statistically not different from 0. The increase of the copayments in 2004 did, thus,
not affect the probability to see GPs and only had a delayed effect on the probability
to see a specialist for this large fraction of the sample.
In latent class 2, on the contrary, the increase in the copayments in 2004 has
changed the probability of use of both types of physicians considerably. While in 2003,
individuals are as likely to visit a GP at least once as in 2002, they are 8 percentage
points less likely to visit a GP in 2004. In 2005, they are still 5.5 percentage points
less likely to visit a GP compared to 2002. Similarly, the probability of at least one
specialist visit is reduced by 8 percentage points in 2004 and by 6 percentage points
in 2005 compared to 2002. Combining the two types of heterogeneities in one model
thus allows the conclusion that a large group of individuals mainly reacted through
changing their probability of seeing specialists, whereas among individuals in latent
class 2 the probability of both types of visits decreased significantly.
As the copayments can only be avoided entirely by not seeing any doctor, the
effect of the reform on the joint probability of neither seeing a GP nor a specialist is
of particular interest. Table 3.5 reports average marginal effects on the different joint
probabilities for the three years 2003, 2004, and 2005 compared to 2002. Column 1 and
2 of table 3.5 display the effects and their standard errors for latent class 1, columns 3
and 4 for latent class 2, and the last two columns display the overall effect as a weighted
average of the marginal effects in the two latent classes where the weight for each class
is the probability of being in that class.
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Table 3.4: FMM Bivariate Probit – Coefficients and Marginal Effects
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2
Coef SE ME SE Coef SE ME SE
GP
Female 0.002 0.041 0.0002 0.004 0.342*** 0.046 -0.256*** 0.015
Age Splines
Age 19-40 0.011*** 0.003 0.001*** 0.0003 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.002
Age 40-60 0.018*** 0.006 0.002*** 0.001 0.015* 0.008 0.005* 0.003
Age 60-80 0.018 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.023*** 0.008 0.008*** 0.003
Age > 80 -0.114* 0.062 -0.011* 0.006 -0.009 0.020 -0.003 0.007
Year Dummies
2003 0.070 0.049 0.006 0.004 -0.071 0.045 -0.026 0.017
2004 -0.008 0.050 -0.001 0.005 -0.214*** 0.047 -0.079*** 0.017
2005 -0.080 0.049 -0.008 0.005 -0.149*** 0.047 -0.055*** 0.018
Constant 1.129*** 0.061 -0.421*** 0.094
Specialist
Female 0.748*** 0.031 0.551*** 0.008 0.286*** 0.041 0.103*** 0.015
Age Splines
Age 19-40 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002
Age 40-60 0.027*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.0001 0.003
Age 60-80 -0.021*** 0.006 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.002
Age > 80 -0.041*** 0.012 -0.009*** 0.003 -0.032 0.024 -0.012 0.009
Year Dummies
2003 0.036 0.033 0.008 0.007 -0.077* 0.046 -0.029* 0.017
2004 -0.025 0.033 -0.005 0.007 -0.222*** 0.048 -0.08*** 0.017
2005 -0.092*** 0.033 -0.021*** 0.007 -0.172*** 0.048 -0.063*** 0.017
Constant 0.544*** 0.052 -0.539*** 0.090
ρ 0.324*** 0.026 0.069*** 0.025
pi1 0.736
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: pi1 is the probability of class membership in latent class 1. Standard errors for the marginal
effects are calculated using the delta method.
The strongest reaction to the increase in copayments is again observed in latent
class 2. The probability of no doctor visit within a year increases by 9.5 percentage
points in 2004 compared to 2002 while the probability to visit both types of physicians,
a specialist and a GP, at least once within the year, decreases by 6.3 percentage points.
In 2005, the effects are slightly smaller, but still highly significant. In latent class 1,
on the contrary, the marginal probabilities do not change significantly in 2004. In
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Table 3.5: FMM Bivariate Probit – Marginal Effects on Joint Probabilities
Latent Class 1 Latent Class 2 Overall
ME SE ME SE ME SE
2003
Pr(GP> 0, Specialist>0) 0.011 0.007 -0.023** 0.01 0.002 0.006
Pr(GP> 0, Specialist=0) -0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.013 -0.004 0.006
Pr(GP= 0, Specialist>0) -0.004 0.003 -0.005 0.011 -0.004 0.003
Pr(GP= 0, Specialist=0) -0.003* 0.002 0.032** 0.014 0.006* 0.004
2004
Pr(GP> 0, Specialist>0) -0.005 0.008 -0.063*** 0.01 -0.021*** 0.006
Pr(GP> 0, Specialist=0) 0.005 0.007 -0.016 0.013 -0.001 0.006
Pr(GP= 0, Specialist>0) 0.0001 0.003 -0.017 0.011 -0.004 0.004
Pr(GP= 0, Specialist=0) 0.001 0.002 0.095*** 0.015 0.026*** 0.004
2005
Pr(GP> 0, Specialist>0) -0.024*** 0.008 -0.048*** 0.011 -0.031*** 0.006
Pr(GP> 0, Specialist=0) 0.016** 0.007 -0.007 0.013 0.01* 0.006
Pr(GP= 0, Specialist>0) 0.004 0.003 -0.014 0.011 -0.001 0.004
Pr(GP= 0, Specialist=0) 0.005** 0.002 0.069*** 0.015 0.022*** 0.004
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Marginal changes are calculated with the respective probabilities in 2002 as reference.
Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
2005, the probability of seeing a GP and a specialist is reduced by 2.4 percentage
points compared to 2002 while at the same time the probability of seeing only GPs
increases by 1.6 percentage points and the probability of no doctor visit increases by
.5 percentage points.
The marginal effects on the joint probabilities, thus, reveal further differences be-
tween the two latent classes. In latent class 2 individuals immediately react to the
increase in the copayments by reducing their probability to see any doctor. In latent
class 1 the reaction occurs only in 2005, and occurs mainly through focussing on only
one type of visit, in particular on GP visits. This reaction could be explained by the
referral to other doctors that is needed in order to avoid the per-quarter fee. When
an individual has already paid the fee at the first visit in a quarter, additional visits
to other doctors are only exempt from the fee if the already consulted doctor writes
a referral for the specific other type of physician. The question whether the delayed
reaction in latent class 1 could be due to changes in the practice of writing referrals in
2005 is left for further research.
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Figure 3.2: Predicted Probabilities in 2002
The results suggest that the introduction of the per-quarter fee might have strength-
ened the role of the GP in the German statutory health insurance. While GPs are not
officially implemented as gatekeepers, i.e. individuals can choose to directly visit a
specialist for a given disease and this would not cost them more than visiting a GP
first, the reform nevertheless induces a large part of the sample to focus on GP visits.
This might highlight the possibility of introducing gatekeeping into a health insurance
system in a way that does not limit the patients’ choices.
Naturally, the question arises who the individuals are that belong to the different
latent classes. Based on our model’s predictions, we can compare the two latent classes
in terms of the probability of use of doctor visits. Figure 3.2 displays the predicted
probabilities of using the different types of physicians in 2002. It shows that in latent
class 1 the probability of no doctor visit within the year 2002 is about 2 percent. Most
of these individuals thus go to a doctor at least once within a year. And most of
them see both, a GP and a specialist at least once. The probability to see both types
of physicians is 81 percent. In latent class 2, the picture looks very different. The
predicted probability to see no physician at all within the year 2002 is 34 percent, the
probability to see both types of physicians is only 19 percent. Latent class 1 might
thus be described as the group of likely users, while individuals in latent class 2 are
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the less-likely users.
Overall, we find evidence for heterogeneous effects of increases in copayments.
When analyzing the two types of heterogeneities independently of each other, we find
that a large class of likely users of health care reacts much less to the increase in co-
payments than the small class of less-likely users. Furthermore, the probability of at
least one visit to a GP decreases less than the probability of at least one visit to a spe-
cialist. Simultaneously analyzing both types of heterogeneities reveals that the likely
users not only react less strongly to the increase in copayments, but also by changing
their pattern of use. While the less-likely users visit either type of physician with a
smaller probability after the reform, likely users focus on one type of visit: Instead of
seeing GPs and specialists in a year, they only tend to visit GPs.
3.5 Conclusion
The interest in heterogeneous reform effects has recently increased in the literature.
In order to evaluate heterogeneous effects, more sophisticated econometric models are
needed. In this chapter we develop and apply a finite mixture bivariate probit model
that allows to estimate effects on two binary outcomes in different latent groups in the
population.
We apply our model to estimate the effects of an increase in copayments in the
German statutory health insurance in 2004. In particular, we analyze whether the
reform affected access to different types of health care differently in two latent groups.
The different types of access to health care are measured as the probabilities of at least
one visit to a GP and of at least one visit to a specialist within a year. As earlier
studies of this reform did not distinguish between different types of doctor visits, we
also present results on general access to health care, measured as the probability of at
least one doctor visit per year, irrespective of the type of doctor visited. Furthermore,
we gauge the contribution of our model by also analyzing the effects on the two types
of doctor visits without distinguishing between latent classes.
Using insurance claims data from the largest German sickness fund, we find that
the probability to visit any kind of doctor at least once within a year decreases by
about 3 percentage points after the increase in the copayments. Distinguishing the
results between GP and specialist visits shows that the probability of at least one GP
visit decreases less than the probability of at least one specialist visit. Furthermore,
we can distinguish two underlying groups: likely users who react less to the increase
in copayments and less-likely users who show a strong reduction in the probability
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to visit a doctor. This result aligns with findings in the literature that the demand
for health care is more elastic among low users of health care than among high users
(Bago d’Uva, 2006; Winkelmann, 2006).
Combining the analysis of the two types of heterogeneities into one model allows to
uncover that the likely users not only react less to the increase in copayments than the
less-likely users. They also react in a different way: While the less-likely users tend to
go to neither type of doctor after the reform, the likely users change their behavior by
focussing on one type of doctor visits. They are more likely to visit only a GP after the
increase of the copayments and less likely to see both, a specialist and a GP. This might
indicate that per-quarter fees for doctor visits have the potential to concentrate visits
to one type of doctor. In particular, they may help to establish GPs as gatekeepers
without actually forcing individuals to visit a GP first.
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Appendix: Marginal Effects
Marginal effects on the probabilities of each type of doctor visit and on the joint prob-
abilities for the different combinations of the different types of visits are calculated.
Standard errors for the marginal effects are derived using the delta method. For con-
tinuous explanatory variables the marginal effects are calculated using the calculus
method. Marginal effects of binary variables are calculated with the finite difference
method.
For a continuous variable x the marginal effect on the different joint probabilities
for y1i and y2i in latent class j are calculated for individual i
MExiPr(y1i, y2i|xi)j = ∂Φ2(q1ix
′βj, q2ix′iγj, q1iq2iρj)
∂xi
(3.3)
= q1iβx,jφ(q1ix
′
iβj)Φ
q2ix′iγj − q21iq2iρjx′iβj√
1− ρ2j

+ q2iγx,jφ(q2ix
′
iγj)Φ
q1ix′iβj − q1iq22iρjx′iγj√
1− ρ2j

where Φ2 stands for the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function, Φ and
φ are the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and density
respectively, and qki = 2yki − 1, where k ∈ {1, 2}. The values are averaged over all
individuals to get the average marginal effect.
Marginal effects of the continuous variable x on the marginal probabilities of the
outcomes in latent class j for individual i are calculated as
MExiPr(y1i = 1|xi)j = βx,jφ(x′iβj) (3.4)
MExiPr(y2i = 1|xi)j = γx,jφ(x′iγj) (3.5)
The individual marginal effects on the joint outcome probabilities of the years 2003,
2004 and 2005 compared to 2002 in latent class j for individual i are calculated as
MEyear,iPr(y1i, y2i|xi)j = Φ2 (q1i(x′iβj + βyear,j), q2i(x′iγj + γyear,j), q1iq2iρj) (3.6)
− Φ2(q1ix′iβj, q2ix′iγj, q1iq2iρj)
where qki is defined as above, and βj and γj are vectors of parameter estimates for
all variables but the year indicators. Again the averages of these marginal effects over
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all individuals are reported.
Marginal effects of the year dummies on the marginal probabilities for each indi-
vidual i are derived as
MEyear,iPr(y1i = 1|xi)j = Φ(q1i(x′iβj + βyear,j))− Φ(q1ix′iβj) (3.7)
MEyear,iPr(y2i = 1|xi)j = Φ(q2i(x′iγj + γyear,j))− Φ(q2ix′iγj) (3.8)
The overall marginal effect, i.e. the marginal effect averaged over the latent classes,
for any continuous or discrete variable x is then derived as weighted average of the
marginal effects across the different latent classes
MExi =
∑
j
pijMExi,j (3.9)
Averages over all individuals are reported.
Standard errors for the average marginal effects are derived using the delta method
that delivers the variance for each average marginal effect as
V ar(ME) = ∇′gV ar(θ)∇g (3.10)
where θ is the vector of all parameters that are estimated (βj,γj,ρj, and p, where
pi = exp(p)
1+exp(p)
) and ∇g stands for the gradient of the marginal effect, ME = g(θ), with
respect to θ. In order to calculate the variance on the average marginal effect, we set
each element in the gradient to its sample average.
Chapter 4
Is traditional teaching really all that
bad? A within-student
between-subject approach
4.1 Introduction
Recent studies stress the importance of teachers for student learning. However, the
question what actually determines teacher quality, i.e. what makes one teacher more
successful in enhancing her students’ performance than another, has not been settled so
far (Aaronson et al., 2007). Different categories of teacher variables have been analyzed.
Some studies focus on the impact of a teacher’s gender and race on teacher quality
(Dee, 2005, 2007). Others try to uncover the relationship between student outcomes
and teacher qualifications such as teaching certificates, other paper qualifications or
teaching experience (Kane et al., 2008). Such observable teacher characteristics are,
however, generally found to have only little impact on student achievement and can
only explain a relatively small part of overall teacher quality (Aaronson et al., 2007;
Rivkin et al., 2005). Most of the variation in teacher quality can be attributed to
unobserved factors.1
While most of these studies focus on characteristics of the teacher, this chapter
directly peers into the black box of educational production by focusing on the actual
teaching process. More specifically, we contrast two teaching practices (as currently
implemented in practice), teaching by giving lecture style presentations with teaching
based on in-class problem solving, and investigate the impact on student achievement.
1This finding led researchers, concerned with providing recommendations for recruitment policies
and designing optimal teacher pay schemes, to suggest to identify effective teachers by their actual
performance on the job using “value added” measures of student achievement (Gordon et al., 2006).
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Giving lecture style presentations is often regarded as old-fashioned and connected with
many disadvantages: Lectures fail to provide instructors with feedback about student
learning and rest on the presumption that all students learn at the same pace. More-
over, students’ attention wanes quickly during lectures and information tends to be
forgotten quickly when students are passive. Finally, lectures emphasize learning by
listening, which is a disadvantage for students who prefer other learning styles. Alterna-
tive instructional practices based on active and problem-oriented learning presumably
do not suffer from these disadvantages. National standards (NCTM, 1991; National
Research Council, 1996) consequently advocate engaging students more in hands-on
learning activities and group work. Despite these recommendations traditional lecture
and textbook methodologies continue to dominate science and mathematics instruction
in US middle schools (Weiss, 1997). This raises the question whether student achieve-
ment could be raised by reducing the high share of teaching time devoted to lecture
style presentations.
By addressing this question, this study adds to the literature analyzing the impact
of teaching process variables such as teaching practices on student outcomes.2 Despite
the importance of teaching practices for student performance as recognized by educa-
tional researchers (Seidel and Shavelson, 2007) and their potential relatively low-cost
implementation, economists have only recently begun to analyze the impact of teach-
ing methods on student achievement.3 Various dimensions of teaching practices have
been shown to be able to explain a large share of the between-teacher variation in stu-
dent achievement (Schacter and Thum, 2004). However, to our knowledge no rigorous
empirical analysis of the effect of lecture style teaching compared to in-class problem
solving as implemented in practice today exists.4
To study the effect of lecture style teaching relative to teaching based on in-class
problem solving we use information on in-class time use provided by teachers in the
2003 wave of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in
US schools. Estimating a reduced form educational production function and exploit-
ing between-subject variation to control for unobserved student traits, we find that
the choice of teaching practices matters for student achievement. We find that a 10
2For an overview see Goe (2007).
3Brewer and Goldhaber (1997) and Aslam and Kingdon (2007) analyze the impact of many different
teaching methods. Rouse and Krueger (2004), Banerjee et al. (2007), and Barrow et al. (2009)
investigate the effectiveness of computer-aided instruction and Machin and McNally (2008) analyze
an education policy that changed reading instruction.
4Note that our results do not allow any comparison between teaching practices when implemented
ideally, but only allow a comparison of lecture-style teaching with problem-style learning approaches
as implemented in practice.
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percentage point shift from problem solving to lecture style presentation results in an
increase in student achievement of about 1 percent of a standard deviation.
This result is highly robust. Consistent with other studies in this literature, we
find no evidence for significant effects of commonly investigated observable teacher
characteristics such as teaching certificates or teaching experience. While we are able
to control for a huge array of observable teacher traits, selection of teachers based on
unobservable characteristics into teaching methods remains an issue. The bias resulting
from potential selection of teachers with different unobservable attributes into different
teaching methods is assessed following the technique pioneered in Altonji et al. (2005).
The results indicate that only relatively low selection on unobservables compared to the
selection on observables is necessary to explain the entire estimated effect. We would
thus not formulate policy conclusions that call for more lecture style teaching compared
to problem solving in general. However, a negative causal effect of giving lecture style
presentations that is hidden in our results due to selection based on unobserved teacher
traits is also not very likely. It can only exist if “good” teachers (teachers with favorable
unobserved characteristics) predominately select themselves into an inferior teaching
technique. This scenario, however, lacks any intuitive or theoretical support and thus
appears extremely implausible. We therefore do not find any evidence that the high
share of total teaching time devoted to traditional lecture style teaching in science
and mathematics instruction in US middle schools has detrimental effects on student
achievement. Our findings imply that simply changing the teaching method from
lecture style presentation to problem solving without concern for how the methods are
implemented has little potential for raising overall achievement levels.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: the following section reviews
the literature on teaching practices. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes
the estimation strategy. Headline results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6
provides a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
4.2 Literature on Teaching Practices
There are two strands of literature that are closely related to our study. The first strand
analyzes the impact of different teaching styles on student achievement. In these studies
teaching style variables are meant to proxy for broader pedagogical concepts. A certain
teaching style may consist of a combination of different teaching practices, where the
term teaching practice indicates the actual classroom activity, like giving a lecture
style presentation or reviewing homework. The effects of single teaching practices are
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analyzed by the second strand of the related literature.
Findings of the first strand of literature on teaching style speak in favor of mod-
ern, interactive teaching styles. Slavin et al. (2009) review recent research on the
achievement outcomes of mathematics programs for middle and high schools. The
most striking observation of this review is the evidence supporting instructional process
strategies, especially cooperative learning. Several studies reveal important impacts of
cooperative learning programs that target teachers’ instructional behaviors rather than
math content alone. The review concludes that educators and researchers might do
well to focus more on what is actually happening in the classroom.
In an earlier meta-analysis, Lou et al. (1996) focus on a typical component of
cooperative learning strategies, namely within-class grouping. The authors conclude
that within-class grouping has the potential to raise student achievement. In particular,
it works best when the physical placement of students into groups is combined with
the adaptation of instruction methods and materials for small-group learning. Dignath
and Büttner (2008) find negative impacts of group work for primary school students
in another meta-analysis. While these results are somehow in contradiction to the
findings by Lou et al. (1996) and Slavin et al. (2009), the authors emphasize that
presumably the implementation of cooperative learning strategies into real classroom
settings matters.
Results from a study by Machin and McNally (2008) also support the idea that
coordinated and comprehensive changes in instructional practices are beneficial for
student learning. This study analyzes the effects of the introduction of the “literacy
hour” in English primary schools in the late 1990s. This policy intervention by the
British government changed how primary school students are taught to read. Using
the fact that not all schools started the literacy hour at the same point in time in a
difference-in-difference framework, the authors show that the literacy hour significantly
increased reading skills for low ability student while high ability students were not
affected.
The findings of these studies suggest that the overall teaching style matters for stu-
dent achievement. In particular, modern, interactive teaching styles have the potential
to positively affect student learning. However, the implementation of more interactive
teaching strategies into real classroom settings matters. There appear to be impor-
tant interaction effects between individual instruction practices, curricula, teaching
materials, and teacher experience with more interactive teaching styles.
The second strand of literature analyzes individual teaching practices more specifi-
cally. A first group of studies in this area analyzes the use of computer based instruc-
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tion. The evidence on the use of computer programs is mixed for different subjects.
On the one hand, Rouse and Krueger (2004) find that literacy skills of 3rd and 6th
grade students in a large US urban school district do not profit from the use of com-
puter programs for teaching language and reading. Students’ math skills, on the other
hand, are found to increase due to computer-aided instruction as shown by Banerjee
et al. (2007) for India and Barrow et al. (2009) for the US. Computer-based instruction
might thus be more effective in some than in other subjects.
Other teaching practices that have received some attention in the literature are
accountability measures. Wenglinsky (2002) finds that frequent testing of students
is positively related to students’ test scores taking into account student background
and prior performance. Bonesrønning (2004) analyzes if grading practices affect stu-
dent achievement in Norway and finds evidence that easy grading deteriorates student
achievement. The design of tests might also matter. This hypothesis is supported
by findings of Matsumura et al. (2002). This study finds evidence for a positive link
between the quality of assignments that students are asked to do and overall student
performance. These findings emphasize the importance of taking into account other
categories of in-class time use such as accountability measures when studying the ef-
fect of teaching by giving lecture style presentations in comparison to in-class problem
solving.
More closely related to this chapter in terms of the teaching practices analyzed and
identification strategy are the analyses by Brewer and Goldhaber (1997) and Aslam
and Kingdon (2007). Brewer and Goldhaber (1997) estimate different specifications of
education production functions for tenth grade students in math with data from the
National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988. They conclude that teacher behavior
is important in explaining student test scores. Controlling for student background,
prior performance and school and teacher characteristics, they find that instruction in
small groups and emphasis on problem solving lead to lower student test scores.
Aslam and Kingdon (2007) analyze the impact of different teaching practices on
student achievement in Pakistan. Their identification strategy rests on within student
across subject (rather than across time) variation, which is similar to the identification
strategy employed in this analysis. They find that students taught by teachers who
spend more time on lesson planning and by teachers who ask more questions in class
have higher test scores.
Similar to this second strand of studies we focus on a comparison of single teaching
practices, namely time devoted to teaching by giving lecture style presentations versus
time devoted to teaching by problem solving. As lecture style teaching is a teaching
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practice that is often associated with more traditional, didactic or teacher-centered
teaching styles, while problem solving is connected to more modern, interactive or
student-centered approaches to teaching, our results might be also of a more general
interest. Strictly speaking, however, our data only allows to draw conclusions about
actual classroom activities.
4.3 Data
The data used in this study is the 2003 wave of the Trends in International Mathematics
and Science Study (TIMSS). In this study we focus on country information for the US.
In TIMSS, students in 4th grade and in 8th grade were tested in math and science.
We limit our analysis to 8th grade students, because 4th grade students are typically
taught by one teacher in all subjects.
We standardize the test scores for each subject to be mean 0 and standard deviation
1. In addition to test scores in the two tested subjects, the TIMSS data provide
background information on student home and family. For the purpose of this analysis
it is crucial that TIMSS allows linking students to teachers. Each student’s teachers
in math and science are surveyed on their characteristics, qualifications and teaching
practices. Additionally, school principals provide information on school characteristics.
The key variable of interest in this chapter is derived from question 20 in the
teacher questionnaires in the 2003 wave of TIMSS. Unfortunately, this precise question
was not asked in previous waves of TIMSS. We therefore limit our analysis to the
2003 wave. Teachers are asked in 2003 to report what percentage of time in a typical
week of the specific subject’s lessons students spend on eight in-class activities. Our
three main categories of interest are listening to lecture style presentation, working
on problems with the teacher’s guidance and working on problems without guidance.
The overall time in class spent on these three activities likely provides a good proxy
for the time in class in which students are taught new material. The main interest
of this study is to contrast teaching by giving lecture style presentations to teaching
based on problem solving. The two problem solving categories are thus combined into
a single teaching practice: teaching based on problem solving. To allow a comparison
of the two categories we construct a single variable, lecture style teaching, that is the
percent of time spent giving lecture style presentation relative to the percent of time
spent on either of the two activities ( lecture(%)
lecture(%)+problemsolving(%)
). The key advantage is
that a change in this variable can directly be interpreted as a shift from spending time
on one to spending time on the other practice holding constant the overall time spent
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on these two practices. For example, an increase in this variable of 0.1 indicates that
10 percentage points of total time devoted to teaching new material are shifted from
teaching based on problem solving to giving lecture style presentations.
The remaining 5 activities include reviewing homework, listening to the teacher
reteach and clarify content, taking tests or quizzes, classroom management and other
activities. We simply group these activities and construct a single variable, other class
activities, which measures the share of total time in class spent on other activities.
We include this variable as a control in all specifications. To analyze the robustness
of our results we also estimate specifications that include the individual shares of all
categories. Moreover, teachers also report the total time in minutes per week that they
teach math or science to the class, which we also include as a control variable in most
specifications.
The TIMSS 2003 US data set contains student-teacher observations on 8,912 stu-
dents in 232 schools. 41 of those students have more than one teacher in science. These
students are not included in the estimation sample. 8,871 students in 231 schools in
455 math classes taught by 375 different math teachers and in 1,085 science classes
taught by 475 different science teachers remain in the sample. Not all of the students
and teachers completed their questionnaires. In order not to lose a large amount of
observations we impute missing values of all control variables and include indicators for
imputed values in all estimations.5 2,561 students have, however, missing information
on our teaching practice variable of interest. These observation are dropped from the
analysis. 6,310 students in 205 schools with 639 teachers (303 math teachers and 355
science teachers, where 19 teachers teach both subjects) remain in the sample.
Furthermore due to the sampling design of TIMSS, students are not all selected
with the same probability. A two stage sampling design makes it necessary to take
probability weights into account when estimating summary statistics (Martin, 2005).
All estimation results take the probability weights into account and allow for correlation
between error terms within schools.6
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics on observable teacher characteristics sepa-
rately for math and science teachers. Mean differences are reported in the last column
of table 4.1. The share of teachers with math or science majors naturally differs be-
5Experimenting with different imputation procedures revealed that our main results do not depend
on the method of imputation. Main results remain also qualitatively unchanged when simply deleting
observations with missing values. Results presented in the chapter are based on a simple mean-
imputation procedure.
6In addition, the two step procedure of sampling could be incorporated in the estimation of standard
errors. For simplicity, we ignore the latter in the following analysis which then gives us conservative
estimates of the standard errors.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics – Teacher variables
Math Science
303 teachers 355 teachers
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference
In-class time use
Lecture style teaching 0.320 0.187 0.374 0.202 -0.054***
Other class activities 0.428 0.119 0.446 0.161 -0.018
Total teaching time ( min
week
) 226.27 43.89 223.72 47.34 2.55
Teacher variables
Teacher is female 0.649 0.473 0.540 0.496 0.109**
Full teaching certificate 0.970 0.163 0.957 0.188 0.013
Major in math 0.473 0.492 0.099 0.294 0.374***
Major in science 0.146 0.348 0.584 0.486 -0.438***
Major in education 0.598 0.483 0.456 0.491 0.142***
Teacher younger than 30 0.119 0.322 0.143 0.349 -0.024
Teacher aged 30-39 0.273 0.443 0.223 0.414 0.050
Teacher aged 40-49 0.293 0.452 0.335 0.469 -0.042
Teaching experience < 1 year 0.043 0.201 0.042 0.199 0.001
Teaching experience 1-5 years 0.178 0.370 0.224 0.404 -0.046
Teacher training 0 years 0.102 0.301 0.154 0.359 -0.051**
Teacher training 1 year 0.578 0.491 0.523 0.497 0.055
Teacher training 2 years 0.209 0.404 0.193 0.392 0.016
Teacher training 3 years 0.039 0.192 0.048 0.213 -0.009
Teacher training 4 years 0.056 0.228 0.035 0.184 0.021
Teacher training 5 years 0.008 0.090 0.039 0.193 -0.031**
Motivation
Pedagogy classes in last 2 years 0.748 0.431 0.648 0.472 0.100***
Subject content classes in last 2 years 0.840 0.364 0.827 0.374 0.014
Subject curriculum classes in last 2 years 0.830 0.372 0.853 0.349 -0.023
Subject related IT classes in last 2 years 0.729 0.441 0.803 0.393 -0.074**
Subject assessment classes in last 2 years 0.756 0.426 0.649 0.471 0.107***
Classes on improving student’s skills last 2 years 0.759 0.424 0.766 0.418 -0.007
Working hours scheduled per week 21.12 8.28 20.16 7.29 0.960
Weekly hours spent on lesson planning 3.70 2.71 4.68 3.28 -0.976***
Weekly hours spent on grading 5.25 3.93 6.08 4.41 -0.830**
Teaching requirements
Requirement probationary period 0.502 0.493 0.496 0.479 0.007
Requirement licensing exam 0.526 0.493 0.558 0.479 -0.032
Requirement finished Isced5a 0.891 0.307 0.824 0.371 0.067**
Requirement minimum education classes 0.833 0.368 0.777 0.399 0.056
Requirement minimum subject specific classes 0.799 0.395 0.744 0.420 0.056
Note: Probability weights and within school correlation are taken into account when estimating means
and standard deviations. Teacher variables are weighted by the number of students taught by each
teacher.
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tween those two groups. Apart from mean differences in majors several other variables
are significantly different between the two groups. We control for all these observable
differences in teacher traits in our empirical analysis.
To investigate which teachers teach using relatively more lecture style presentations
and which students are more exposed to this method tables 4.2 and 4.3 display averages
of student, school, class and teacher characteristics grouped by the share of lecture
style presentation. The last column of tables 4.2 and 4.3 presents the mean differences
between characteristics of students, schools, classes and teachers with more and less
than the median share of time spent on lecture style presentation.
Table 4.2 reveals that the only student characteristic which shows significant dif-
ferences between the two groups is the number of books that families have at home.
Students who are taught with relatively less time spent on lecture style presentations
seem to have fewer books at home. Furthermore, the share of students in schools for
which the principal reports very low involvement of parents in school activities is higher
among students taught with relatively less time spent on lecture style presentations.
Students exposed to smaller shares of class time devoted to lecture style teaching are
also slightly more likely to be in tracked classes.
Table 4.3 reports teacher characteristics by the intensity of lecture style teaching.
Students taught with relatively less time spent on lecture style teaching have a higher
share of female teachers, more teachers who are at least 50, teachers who have the
maximum number of years of teacher training, and teachers who have taken pedagogical
or content knowledge classes in the last two years. All other teacher characteristics do
not differ significantly between the two groups.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate some potential for selection into different teaching prac-
tices. To control for the confounding impact of these differences in observable char-
acteristics, we include all variables presented in the tables above and additional in-
formation on teaching limits (see table 4.8 in the appendix) in our empirical analysis.
The latter are teacher reports on limitations that they face in teaching. These include
limitations through the class composition, shortages in teaching material, and a high
student teacher ratio.
4.4 Estimation Strategy
To estimate the effect of giving lecture style presentations relative to teaching based
on problem solving we estimate a standard education production function:
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Table 4.2: Student, School and Class Variables by Intensity of Lecture Style Teaching
Lecture Style Lecture Style
> median <= median
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Student
Age 14.22 0.451 14.23 0.470 -0.014
Born in first 6 months 0.501 0.499 0.495 0.499 0.005
Girl 0.522 0.500 0.522 0.499 0.000
Number books at home: 11-25 0.175 0.378 0.173 0.376 0.002
Number books at home: 26-100 0.282 0.448 0.278 0.445 0.004
Number books at home: 101-200 0.185 0.387 0.173 0.375 0.013*
Number books at home: >200 0.248 0.430 0.250 0.430 -0.002
Parental Education lower secondary 0.057 0.208 0.058 0.211 -0.001
Parental Education upper secondary 0.248 0.388 0.253 0.392 -0.005
Parental Education post secondary voc/technical 0.094 0.264 0.088 0.254 0.006
Parental Education university 0.577 0.445 0.571 0.446 0.006
Number people at home 3 0.165 0.368 0.170 0.372 -0.005
Number people at home 4 0.347 0.472 0.350 0.472 -0.003
Number people at home 5 0.255 0.432 0.251 0.429 0.004
Number people at home 6 0.108 0.307 0.104 0.303 0.003
Number people at home 7 0.046 0.207 0.042 0.198 0.004
Number people at home 8 or more 0.039 0.192 0.039 0.193 0.000
Never speaks English at home 0.044 0.205 0.048 0.213 -0.004
Sometime speaks English at home 0.099 0.298 0.093 0.289 0.006
Almost always speaks English at home 0.845 0.360 0.843 0.361 0.002
Immigrant 0.141 0.347 0.144 0.349 -0.003
School
Community, 3001-15,000 people 0.188 0.375 0.228 0.403 -0.041
Community, 15,001-50,000 people 0.330 0.454 0.293 0.435 0.037
Community, 50,001 - 100,000 people 0.121 0.314 0.118 0.309 0.003
Community, 100,001 - 500,000 people 0.137 0.331 0.130 0.321 0.007
Community, more than 500,000 people 0.125 0.319 0.111 0.299 0.014
Parental involvement in school - very low 0.130 0.319 0.204 0.384 -0.074**
Parental involvement in school - low 0.389 0.469 0.324 0.442 0.065
Parental involvement in school - medium 0.300 0.440 0.316 0.441 -0.016
Parental involvement in school - high 0.118 0.311 0.101 0.285 0.017
Class variables
Total teaching time ( min
week
) 221.93 48.60 227.45 43.03 -5.52
Class size 23.95 6.90 24.03 7.20 -0.073
Tracked according to ability 0.319 0.452 0.394 0.469 -0.075*
Note: Lecture style measures the share of teaching time devoted to lecture style teaching instead of
teaching based on problem solving. Median refers to the median of lecture style teaching. Probability
weights and within school correlation are taken into account when estimating means and standard
deviations.
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Table 4.3: Teacher Variables by Intensity of Lecture Style Teaching
Lecture Style Lecture Style
> median <= median
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Teacher variables
Teacher is female 0.535 0.496 0.642 0.475 -0.107**
Full teaching certificate 0.947 0.216 0.977 0.135 -0.031
Major in math 0.265 0.432 0.303 0.455 -0.039
Major in science 0.385 0.477 0.349 0.471 0.036
Major in education 0.515 0.490 0.537 0.493 -0.022
Teacher younger than 30 0.127 0.331 0.134 0.339 -0.007
Teacher aged 40-49 0.367 0.480 0.272 0.442 0.096**
Teacher at least 50 0.256 0.434 0.347 0.473 -0.091**
Teaching experience < 1 year 0.045 0.205 0.041 0.197 0.004
Teaching experience 1-5 years 0.229 0.406 0.180 0.372 0.049
Teacher training 0 years 0.130 0.334 0.127 0.331 0.003
Teacher training 1 year 0.568 0.492 0.537 0.496 0.031
Teacher training 2 years 0.213 0.407 0.191 0.391 0.022
Teacher training 3 years 0.036 0.185 0.050 0.216 -0.013
Teacher training 4 years 0.040 0.195 0.050 0.216 -0.009
Teacher training 5 years 0.008 0.089 0.036 0.186 -0.028**
Teacher motivation
Pedagogy classes in last 2 years 0.633 0.476 0.749 0.429 -0.116***
Subject content classes in last 2 years 0.792 0.402 0.865 0.338 -0.073**
Subject curriculum classes in last 2 years 0.818 0.381 0.860 0.342 -0.042
Subject related IT classes in last 2 years 0.780 0.409 0.754 0.427 0.025
Subject assessment classes in last 2 years 0.671 0.464 0.728 0.441 -0.057
Classes on improving student’s skills last 2 years 0.757 0.424 0.768 0.418 -0.011
Working hours scheduled per week 20.82 7.45 20.50 8.09 0.322
Weekly hours spent on lesson planning 4.29 3.14 4.12 2.96 0.170
Weekly hours spent on grading 5.66 3.85 5.67 4.45 -0.013
Teaching requirements
Requirement probationary period 0.503 0.484 0.496 0.487 0.008
Requirement licensing exam 0.523 0.486 0.556 0.487 -0.033
Requirement finished ISCED 5a 0.858 0.340 0.857 0.343 0.001
Requirement minimum education classes 0.779 0.402 0.826 0.369 -0.047
Requirement minimum subject specific classes 0.740 0.425 0.797 0.392 -0.056
Note: Lecture style measures the share of teaching time devoted to lecture style teaching instead of
teaching based on problem solving. Median refers to the median of lecture style teaching. Probability
weights and within school correlation are taken into account when estimating means and standard
deviations. Teacher variables are weighted by the number of students taught by each teacher.
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Yijk = cj +B
′
ijkβ1j + S
′
ijkβ2j + T
′
ijkβ3j + Lectureijkβ4j + ijk. (4.1)
The test score, Yijk, of student i in subject j in school k is explained by a subject
specific constant cj, student background characteristics, Bijk, school characteristics,
Sijk, teacher and class characteristics, Tijk, and the variable Lectureijk. The last
variable constitutes the focus of this analysis. It represents teaching time spent on
lecture style presentation relative to problem solving. The error term, ijk, contains all
unobservable influences on student test scores. In particular, it contains the effects of
unobservable student, µi , teacher, ξj, and school characteristics, νk:
ijk = µi + ξj + νk + ψijk (4.2)
Estimating equation (4.1) by ordinary least squares produces biased estimates if
unobserved school characteristics, νk, and Lectureijk are correlated. This can be the
case if the choice of the teaching practice is partly determined by the school and if
there exists sorting of high ability students or effective teachers into schools.
To eliminate the effects of between-school sorting, we use school fixed effects, sk, to
exclude any systematic between-school variation in performance or teaching practice,
whatever its source:
Yijk = cj +B
′
ikβ1j + sk + T
′
ijkβ3j + Lectureijkβ4j + µi + ξj + ψijk. (4.3)
The estimates produced by equation (4.3) could still be biased by within-school
sorting wherever schools have more than one class per subject per grade. We therefore
eliminate the influence on constant student traits by differencing between subjects:
∆Yi = cm − cs +B′i(β1m − β1s) + S ′i(β2m − β2s) (4.4)
+T ′imβ3m − T ′isβ3s + Lectureimβ4m − Lectureisβ4s + ηi
where ∆Yi = Yim − Yis and ηi = ξm − ξs + ψim − ψis.
In our headline specification we follow Dee (2005, 2007) by assuming that coeffi-
cients for each variable are equal across the two subjects:7
∆Yi = ∆T
′
iβ3 + ∆Lectureiβ4 + ηi. (4.5)
7We do, however, estimate equation (4.4) as a robustness check.
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The estimate of the effect of teaching practice on student achievement produced
by equation (4.5) is not biased due to between or within school sorting of students
based on unobservable student traits. We do, however, have to make the identifying
assumption that unobservable teacher characteristics that directly influence student
achievement are not related to the choice of the teaching method. In other words, ηi is
uncorrelated with all other right-hand side variables. This is a strong assumption and
we therefore refrain from interpreting β4 as causal effect. We rather interpret β4 as a
measure for the link between a teaching practice and student achievement that is not
driven by between or within school sorting of students. It might, however, be partly
driven by sorting of teachers into a special teaching method based on unobservable
teacher traits.
We evaluate the concern of selection on unobservables by borrowing a procedure
from Altonji et al. (2005) which allows to evaluate the bias of the estimate under the
assumption that selection on unobservables occurs to the same degree as selection on
observables. As developed in the appendix the asymptotic bias of β̂4 in our application
is
Bias(β̂4) =
Cov( ˜∆Lecture, η)
V ar( ˜∆Lecture)
=
Cov(∆Lecture, η)
V ar( ˜∆Lecture)
(4.6)
where indices are omitted for simplicity and where ˜∆Lecture is the residual of
a linear projection of ∆Lecture on all other between-subject differences of control
variables, represented by ∆T . The second equality holds if the other controls (T ) are
orthogonal to η. The condition that selection on unobservables is equal to selection on
observables can be stated as
Cov(∆T ′β3,∆Lecture)
V ar(∆T ′β3)
=
Cov(∆Lecture, η)
V ar(η)
(4.7)
Equation (4.7) can be used to estimate the numerator of the bias of β̂4, once we have
consistent estimates for β3. Under the assumptions that the true effect of lecture style
teaching is zero and again that T is orthogonal to η, β3 can be consistently estimated
(see appendix).
The estimated bias displays the effect we would estimate even if the true effect
was zero when selection on unobservables is as strong as selection on observables. In
addition, we report the ratio of the estimated β4 from equation (4.5) and the estimated
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bias giving a hint of how large selection on unobservables would have to be compared
to selection on observables to explain the entire estimated effect. A value higher than
one indicates that selection on unobservables needs to be stronger than selection on
observables to explain the entire estimate, in case of a ratio lower than one already
weaker selection on unobservables than on observables suffices to explain the entire
estimate.
4.5 Results
Estimates of the effect of teaching practices based on the different methods advanced
in Section 4.4 are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Each regression is performed at the
level of the individual student and each of the estimations also takes into account the
complex data structure produced by the survey design and the multi-level nature of
the explanatory variables.
Table 4.4 reports results from estimating equation (4.1) and equation (4.3). We
estimate both equations separately for math and science. Columns 1 and 3 present
regressions results for math and science based on equation (4.1). These regressions
include a complete set of student- and family-background variables, controls for teacher
and class characteristics as well as characteristics of the school. Given the purpose of
this study, only estimated coefficients for the teaching practice variable of interest and
selected teacher characteristics are reported.
Our key variable of interest, teaching time devoted to lecture style presentation
relative to time spent on problem solving, is estimated to have a positive impact on test
scores in both subjects. In math the estimate is highly significant, while the estimate
in science falls short of achieving statistical significance at any common significance
level.
As discussed in the previous section, these results might be confounded by between
school sorting based on unobservable characteristics of students. Column 2 and 4
therefore report estimation results based on equation (4.3), which includes school fixed
effects. Lecture style presentation is now highly significant in science and the point
estimate significantly increased compared to column 3. The estimate in math, however,
did not change, but lost its statistical significance due to increased standard errors.
To gain statistical power we pool both estimation samples and estimate equations
(4.1) and (4.3) with the joint sample. This approach assumes that the effects of all
right-hand side variables are identical in both subjects. Based on this estimation sample
the relationship between more lecture style presentation and test scores is positive and
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significantly different from zero in both specifications.
The evidence presented in table 4.4 suggests a positive relation between more lecture
style presentation and student achievement. However, within school selection of stu-
dents based on unobservable student characteristics might drive this relationship. For
instance, it is reasonable to assume that teachers adjust the use of teaching practices
according to class composition and average student ability. We therefore difference out
unobserved constant student traits by taking between-subject differences of test scores
and all right-hand side variables as presented in equation (4.5).
Table 4.5 presents estimation results of the between-subject differences approach.
We start out with a very basic specification without further controls in column 1
and successively add more controls that vary between subjects to account for subject-
specific differences. In particular column 6 presents our headline results. In this spec-
ification we additionally control for all observable teacher and class characteristics
presented in tables 4.1 and 4.8. It is quite astonishing to see that adding more control
variables in the between-subject specification leaves our estimate for the effect of more
lecture style teaching almost unchanged. Moreover, in contrast to most other control
variables the share of lecture style teaching is estimated to be statistically significant
throughout all specifications presented in table 4.5. Apart from lecture style teaching,
additional minutes per week spent teaching the subject to the class also seem to have
a substantial positive effect on student test scores. This is a very intuitive result as it
simply suggests that students learning is an increasing function of total teaching time.
The specifications in columns 2 to 6 also include other class activities, i.e. the share
of total time in class spent on other activities apart from lecture style presentation or
problem solving, as a control variable. Other class activities include time spent on any
of the other five categories in question 20. In particular, these other activities include
reteaching material and accountability measures like reviewing homework and test and
quizzes. Naturally, not all students understand material when it is taught for the first
time so that reviewing can be beneficial for student achievement. Moreover, previous
research has shown that accountability measures might have positive effects for student
achievement (Wenglinsky, 2002). The overall average effect of all other class activities
is, however, estimated to be small and insignificant.
The estimate of teaching time devoted to lecture style presentation relative to time
spent on problem solving decreases in comparison to the regression results presented
in table 4.4. This indicates that within school sorting matters for the estimation of
teachers’ choice variables such as the degree of lecture style teaching. Estimates for the
effect of more lecture style teaching on student learning in table 4.5 range from 0.14 to
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0.1. Our headline estimate is reported in column 6 with an estimated size of 0.1.8 This
parameter suggests that shifting 10 p.p. of time from problem solving to teaching by
giving lecture style presentations while holding the overall time devoted to these two
activities constant is associated with an increase in student test scores of one percent
of a standard deviation.
In turn, our results imply a negative correlation between more in-class problem
solving and student achievement. This is consistent with the finding in Brewer and
Goldhaber (1997) that more in-class problem solving for tenth grade students in math
is related to lower test scores on a standardized test. Furthermore, the other commonly
investigated teacher characteristics (e.g. gender, experience, credentials etc.) do not
show significant or robust impacts on student achievement as can be seen in table 4.5.
This is in line with previous findings in this literature and emphasizes the importance of
the statistically significant relationship between more lecture style teaching and student
achievement.
As pointed out in the previous section, estimates might still be biased due to se-
lection of teachers into more (or less) lecture style teaching based on unobservable
teacher characteristics. This concern is fostered by previous findings in the literature
that emphasize the importance of unobservable teacher traits for student achievement.
This raises the question: How can these results be interpreted?
The bias and ratio at the end of table 4.5 allow us to shed some light on the question
of the influence of unobservables. The underlying assumption for the estimation of
each bias is that selection on unobservables occurs to the same degree as selection
on observables. In all columns the estimated bias is larger than the point estimate
of the impact of lecture style teaching on student test scores. This is reflected in
the ratios at the end of each column that are always smaller than one, indicating
that selection on unobservables that is weaker than selection on observables suffices
to explain the entire estimated coefficient. In our headline specification in column 6
selection on unobservables that is only 0.07 times as strong as selection on observables
would explain the entire estimated coefficient given that the true effect is zero. On
the one hand, we have included a great amount of control variables so that we believe
that selection on unobservables is likely weaker than selection on observables. On the
other hand, only very little selection on unobservables compared to the selection on
observables suffices to explain the entire effect. Given this uncertainty, we refrain from
8It should be noted that the lecture style teaching variable is based on self-reported time-use by
teachers, which is likely measured with error. If time-use is measured with classical measurement
error, the estimate of the effect of lecture style teaching is biased towards zero. Hence, 0.1 might be
interpreted as a lower bound for the true effect of lecture style teaching.
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interpreting the results as evidence for a causal effect as the positive coefficient could
also reflect selection of teachers with desirable unobserved characteristics into lecture
style teaching.
This raises another question: Why would teachers with different desirable unob-
served characteristics select different degrees of lecture style teaching compared to
problem solving? While a reduced form approach of educational production cannot
mirror the full complexity of the choices involved in the teaching process, we are,
nevertheless, able to pin down the relationship between potential selection based on
unobserved teacher traits and the causal effect of lecture style teaching as our estima-
tion approach eliminated all other likely biases. If no selection based on unobservable
teacher traits exists, our estimates speak for a positive effect of lecture style teaching.
Our estimates might, however, be biased upwards if teachers with desirable unobserved
characteristics more frequently base their instruction on lectures. Theoretically, this
selection bias could be large enough to hide a true negative effect of lecture style
teaching, which would imply that teachers with desirable unobserved characteristics
predominately select themselves into an inferior teaching practice. This scenario, how-
ever, lacks any intuitional or theoretical support. We thus argue that this scenario is
highly implausible and can be excluded, which allows a conservative interpretation of
our results: We find no evidence for any detrimental effect of lecture style teaching on
overall student learning.
It is important to stress that our results are limited to student achievement as
measured by TIMSS test scores.9 Moreover, our results for lecture style teaching
are based on a comparison with teaching based on in-class problem solving. Loosely
speaking our results suggest that on average lecture style teaching is at least not worse
than teaching based on in-class problem solving. The comparison of average effects
might, however, hide significant effect heterogeneities. Depending on the teacher, the
students, the content taught, or other factors the one or the other teaching practice
might be more effective.
Furthermore, our information on teaching practices, which is based on in-class time
use reported by teachers, does not allow us to distinguish between different implementa-
tions of the teaching practices. One worry might be that especially the implementation
of problem-based teaching differs substantially within our sample. Differences between
the ideal and the actual implementation of interactive teaching styles that involve more
problem-based teaching might also reconcile our findings with supportive evidence of
9To the extent that teaching methods cultivate general test-taking abilities differently or generate
different long-term effects, a focus on other learning outcomes or on long-term effects might produce
different results.
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modern approaches to teaching (Lou et al., 1996; Machin and McNally, 2008). Thus,
while a certain teaching practice may be very effective if implemented in the correct
way, an empirical analysis that is based on the actual average implementation of this
teaching practice might not reveal any positive effects. Our results, therefore, do not
call for more lecture style teaching in general. The results rather imply that simply
reducing the amount of lecture style teaching and substituting it with more in-class
problem solving without concern for how this is implemented is unlikely to raise overall
student achievement in math and science.
4.6 Robustness Checks
This section tests the sensitivity of the results presented in section 5 with respect to
other definitions of the lecture style variable and with respect to specifications allowing
for heterogeneous effects. The results of these robustness checks are presented in tables
4.6 and 4.7.
As our grouping of the response categories available to the teacher in question 20
of the 2003 teacher questionnaires in TIMSS could be criticized, we provide evidence
on the effect of interest based on different approaches to construct the lecture style
variable. We test four alternative definitions of the lecture style variable with corre-
sponding estimation results presented in each of the four columns of the upper panel
of table 4.6.
In column 1 time spent re-teaching and clarifying content/procedures is included
in the proxy for lecture style teaching. In column 2 taking tests or quizzes is added to
the problem solving category. Hence, the lecture style teaching variable in column 2
is defined in relation to the enlarged definition of teaching based on problem solving.
In column 3 we decompose the variable other class activities into its elements and
separately control for each category. In column 4 lecture style is defined as the share
of overall time in class spent on giving lecture style presentation.
The coefficients in the upper panel of table 4.6 reveal that redefining our key variable
of interest does not change the estimated impact of more lecture style teaching on
student achievement. While the main purpose of this study is to analyze the teaching
of new material by giving lecture style presentations rather than by letting students
solve problems, it is reassuring to see that increasing the total amount of time in class
devoted to lecture style presentations (in contrast to all other in-class activity) is also
associated with higher student achievement.
Additionally, we present evidence for various sub-samples in the middle panel of
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Table 4.6: Robustness Checks I
Other Definitions
Def 1 Def 2 Def 3 Def 4
Lecture style teaching 0.145** 0.161** 0.134** 0.156*
(0.060) (0.063) (0.054) (0.081)
Observations 6,310 6,310 6,310 6,310
R2 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.035
Subsamples
Same Peers Diff Peers No Track Track
Lecture style teaching 0.355*** 0.082 0.116* 0.116
(0.118) (0.058) (.070) (.091)
Observations 2,205 4,105 3,529 2,292
R2 0.096 0.046 0.065 0.071
Heterogenous effects
Diff Background
Lecture style teaching 0.203*** 0.130*
(math) (0.074) (0.072)
Lecture style teaching –0.105 –0.111
(science) (0.073) (0.071)
Observations 6,310 6,310
R2 0.065 0.081
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variables in all panels and columns are the within-student between-subject dif-
ferences in standardized test scores. All teacher variables, class variables, motivation and teaching
limits are included as controls. Upper panel: In Def 1 time spent re-teaching and clarifying con-
tent/procedures is added to lecture style teaching. In Def 2 taking tests or quizzes is added to
problem solving. Thus, lecture style teaching in column 2 is defined in relation to the enlarged defini-
tion of teaching based on problem solving. In Def 3 the variable ’other class activities’ is decomposed
into its elements and these are separately included to control for each category. Def 4 takes time
spent on giving lecture style presentation in relation to all other time-use categories (problem solving
+ other class activities). Middle panel: Separate estimation for different sub-samples: Column 1
only students with same classmates in both subjects, column 2 students with different classmates.
Column 3 students who are tracked according to ability in either both or none of the two subjects,
column 4 students who are tracked in at least one of the two subjects. Lower panel: Column 1 and 2
allow different coefficients in the two subjects. A negative coefficient for science variables stands for a
positive association with the dependent variable. Column 2 additionally includes student background
as controls. Imputation indicators are included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered at the
school level in parentheses.
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table 4.6. In column 1 and 2 we estimate equation (4.5) for students with the same peers
in math and science and students with different peers, respectively. This distinction
is motivated by the concern that the main effect might be driven by differences in the
classroom composition. In the sub-sample with identical peers in both subjects our
within-student between-subject identification strategy takes care of any potential peer
effects. For students with the same peers in both subjects, shifting 10 p.p. of teaching
time from problem solving to lecture style teaching is associated with an increase of
almost 4 percent of a standard deviation. The estimate in the sub-sample with different
peers decreases to 0.08 and lacks statistical significance. The results indicate that peer
effects do not drive the positive coefficient of lecture style teaching.
Column 3 and 4 of the middle panel of table 4.6 report estimates separately for
students in schools where either no or both subjects are tracked by ability and for
students in schools where tracking on ability exists in only one of the two subjects.
This distinction is motivated by the consideration that tracking on ability might induce
teachers to choose different degrees of lecture style teaching. The results indicate that
the positive association between more lecture style teaching and student achievement
holds in both types of schools. The point estimate is the same for the two groups. In
schools with differential tracking policies, however, it is not statistically significant.
In the lower panel of table 4.6 we investigate subject-specific effects. Column 1
and 2 present estimation results from estimating versions of equation (4.4), where we
abandon the assumption that coefficients for each right-hand side variable are equal
across subjects. As all science variables enter negatively on both sides of equation
(4.4), a negative coefficient for any variable in science masks a positive relationship
between the variable and the science test score. All estimates thus have the expected
signs. They are not statistically significant for science, though. We thus find evidence
for a stronger effect of lecture style teaching in math. A possible interpretation of
the differential effects in the two subjects is that science with its natural emphasis on
experimentation might just be better suited for problem solving.
So far all specifications measured time devoted to certain class activities in shares
while additionally controlling for total teaching time. The specification in shares is
mainly motivated by the data itself as TIMSS asks teachers to report what percentage
of time in a typical week of the specific subject’s lessons students spend on various
activities. The data also contains information on the total time in minutes per week
teachers teach math or science to the class. Thus, we can also construct a proxy for
minutes per week devoted to each activity based on the information on total time
per week and the shares reported by the teachers. While this constructed measure
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Table 4.7: Robustness Checks II: Absolute Time Specification
Variables are measured as minutes per week spent teaching with specific teaching prac-
tice.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lecture style teaching 0.733* 0.751* 0.653 0.826
(0.426) (0.408) (0.480) (0.526)
Problem solving with guidance 0.184 0.174
(0.374) (0.538)
Problem solving w\o guidance 0.058 –0.174
(0.424) (0.538)
Other class activities 0.444 0.551* 0.362 0.536
(0.315) (0.297) (0.365) (0.461)
Total teaching time 0.150 0.236 0.062
(0.293) (0.374) (0.419)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: All teaching practice variables are rescaled as minutes per week divided by (103). Column (1)
groups time spent on all activities but lecture style teaching and problem solving, problem solving
with and without guidance as reference category. Column (2) includes all in-class time use categories,
excluded is total minutes per week. Column (3) uses only problem solving with guidance as reference
category. Column (4) uses only problem solving without guidance as reference category. All speci-
fications are otherwise identical to the specification estimated in Column (6) of table 4.5. Standard
errors clustered at the school level in parentheses.
presumably suffers from larger measurement error than the reported shares alone, we
nevertheless estimate a version of equation (4.5) that is based on variables indicating
various teaching practices measured in minutes per week as a further robustness check.
The results of this robustness check can be seen in table 4.7. All specifications
measure class activities in minutes per week. Otherwise the specifications are identical
to the specification estimated in column 6 of table 4.5. In column 1 of table 4.7,
minutes spent per week with lecture style teaching and minutes spent on other class
activities are included in the specification while minutes spent on problem solving are
excluded as a reference category. One additional minute per week spent on lecture
style teaching instead of problem solving is associated with an increase in test scores
of 0.07 percent of a standard deviation. An increase of 23 minutes, which corresponds
to a 10 p.p. shift in terms of total teaching time devoted to lecture style teaching, thus
results in an increase in test scores of 1.6% of a standard deviation. This is slightly
larger than our headline estimate based on shares of total teaching time. Column 2 of
table 4.7 reveals that increasing the overall time devoted to lecture style teaching leads
to an increase in test scores of the same magnitude as in column 1 when explicitly
including the two problem solving categories and the other class activities. Columns
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3 and 4 control again for total teaching time, but use either problem solving with
the teachers guidance (column 3) or problem solving without guidance (column 4) as
reference categories. The point estimate of lecture style teaching remains positive in
both specifications, but loses significance. The point estimates for the two problem
solving categories in columns 3 and 4 suggest that problem solving with guidance
is slightly more effective than problem solving without guidance. The difference is,
however, not statistically significant.10
In sum, we find positive relationships between more lecture style teaching and stu-
dent achievement in all robustness analyses. The magnitude of the estimated effects
varies between specifications and between sub-samples, with insignificant point esti-
mates in some specification. Importantly, we do not find evidence for any detrimental
effect of lecture style teaching in any specification.
4.7 Conclusion
Existing research on teacher quality allows two conclusions: First, there exists a large
variation in teachers’ ability to improve student achievement. Second, this variation
cannot be explained by common, observable teacher characteristics. The results pre-
sented in this study confirm that these observable teacher characteristics have little
potential for explaining the variation in student achievement. We provide, however,
new evidence on a significant link between teaching practice and student achievement.
The specific teaching practice variable analyzed in this chapter is the share of teach-
ing time devoted to lecture style presentation (in contrast to in-class problem solving).
We construct this variable based on information on in-class time use provided by teach-
ers in the 2003 wave of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) in US schools. Exploiting between-subject variation to control for unobserved
student traits and estimating a reduced form educational production function, we find
that a 10 percentage point shift from problem solving to lecture style presentation
results in an increase in student achievement of about one percent of a standard devi-
ation. We further show that this result is extremely robust to definitional changes in
the construction of the main variable of interest as well as to specifications allowing
for heterogeneous effects.
This finding suggests that students taught by teachers, who devote more teaching
10Estimating corresponding specifications to columns 3 and 4 of table 4.7 based on specifications
with lecture style teaching measured in percent of time as in table 4.5 reveals slightly lower estimates
for the coefficient on lecture style teaching compared to our headline estimate presented in column 6
of table 4.5.
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time to lecture style presentation rather than letting students solve problems on their
own or with the teacher’s guidance, learn more (in terms of competencies tested in
the TIMSS student achievement test). This result stands in contrast to constructivist
theories of learning. It is, however, in line with previous findings in the literature
(Brewer and Goldhaber, 1997) showing that instruction in small groups and emphasis
on problem solving lead to lower student test scores.
We emphasize, however, that our results demand a careful interpretation and need
to be taken for what they are: Evidence for a positive association between more time
devoted to lecture style teaching and student achievement that is neither driven by
selection of particular students into schools or classes nor by selection of teachers
based on various observable characteristics into a particular teaching method. However,
selection based on unobservable teacher characteristics remains a worry. Following
the method developed in Altonji et al. (2005), we show that only a relatively small
selection based on unobservables suffices to explain the entire estimated coefficient.
We thus refrain from formulating any policy conclusions that call for more lecture style
teaching in general.
We are nevertheless able to draw an important conclusion about the nature of the
causal effect of lecture style teaching on student achievement as we eliminated any
potential biases arising from sorting of students, differences in schools and observable
differences in teacher traits in our empirical approach. The existence of a sizeable
negative causal effect of lecture style teaching would only be consistent with our results
if teachers with favorable unobserved characteristics predominantly select themselves
into an inferior teaching practice. Such a scenario, however, lacks any intuitional and
theoretical support. We can thus exclude the possibility of a sizeable detrimental effect
of lecture style teaching in math and science instruction on overall student achievement
in US middle schools.
We believe that this result is relevant for the debate on optimizing the teaching
process. Various dimensions of teaching practices have been shown to matter for stu-
dent achievement. Moreover, the low-cost implementation of changes in the teaching
process compared to other policy measures designed to foster student learning makes
improvements in the teaching process particularly appealing. There exists, however,
little consensus about what measures could improve the teaching process. Reducing
the amount of traditional instruction based on lecture style teaching is typically a key
candidate. Lectures are potentially connected with many disadvantages and might
therefore be an inferior teaching method. National standards (NCTM, 1991; National
Research Council, 1996) also advocate engaging students more in hands-on learning
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activities and group work, but traditional lecture and textbook methodologies remain
dominant in science and mathematics instruction in US middle schools. This raises the
concern that the high share of total teaching time devoted to traditional lecture presen-
tations has a detrimental effect on overall student learning in US middle schools. Our
results, however, rather imply that, while newer teaching methods might be beneficial
for student achievement if implemented in an ideal way, simply inducing teachers to
shift time in class from lecture style presentations to problem solving without concern
for how this is implemented contains little potential to increase student achievement.
On the contrary, our results indicate that there might even be adverse effects on student
learning.
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Appendix
Selection on unobservables following Altonji et al. (2005)
Formally, in our application the assumption that selection on unobservables occurs to
the same degree as selection on observables as imposed by Altonji, Elder and Taber
(2005) can be stated as:
Proj(∆Lecture|∆Tβ3, η) = φ0 + φ∆T ′β3∆T ′β3 + φηη (4.8)
with φ∆T ′β3 = φη (4.9)
Where ∆Lecture captures the between subject differences in the teaching time
devoted to lecture style presentation relative to problem solving and β4 indicates its
coefficient while T includes all other k control variables (teacher characteristics, time
spent on other classroom activities, as well as class characteristics) and β3 is a kx1
vector of coefficients. When ∆T ′β3 is orthogonal to η the assumption (4.9) is equal to
Cov(∆T ′β3,∆Lecture)
V ar(∆T ′β3)
=
Cov(η,∆Lecture)
V ar(η)
(4.10)
We proceed now to answer the question how large selection on unobservables relative
to selection on observabels would have to be in order to explain the entire estimate
of β4 under the assumption that the true β4 is 0. Following Altonji et al. (2005) we
regress ∆Lecture on ∆T , to get
∆Lecture = ∆T ′δ + ˜∆Lecture.
Plugging this into our equation (4.5) yields:
∆Y = c+ ∆T ′(β3 + δ · β4) + ˜∆Lectureβ4 + η (4.11)
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As ˜∆Lecture is by construction orthogonal to ∆T the probability limit of β̂4 can
be written as
plim β̂4 = β4 +
Cov( ˜∆Lecture, η)
V ar( ˜∆Lecture)
where
Cov( ˜∆Lecture, η)
V ar( ˜∆Lecture)
=
Cov(∆Lecture, η)
V ar( ˜∆Lecture)
as ∆T is orthogonal to η.
To estimate the numerator of the bias we can use the equality (4.10):
Cov(∆T ′β3,∆Lecture)
V ar(∆T ′β3)
· V ar(η).
For this however, we need a consistent estimate of β3 which we obtain by estimating
equation (4.11) under the assumption that β4 = 0.
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Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics – Class Characteristics
Math Science
359 classes 734 classes
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Class variables
Class size 23.46 6.54 24.57 7.51 -1.11**
Tracked according to ability 0.550 0.480 0.171 0.363 0.379***
Teaching limits (reference not at all/not applicable)
Differing academic ability - a little 0.339 0.469 0.340 0.473 -0.002
Differing academic ability - some 0.330 0.466 0.321 0.466 0.008
Differing academic ability - a lot 0.204 0.399 0.174 0.378 0.031
Wide range of backgrounds - a little 0.308 0.456 0.277 0.447 0.031
Wide range of backgrounds - some 0.205 0.399 0.238 0.425 -0.032
Wide range of backgrounds - a lot 0.060 0.234 0.078 0.267 -0.018
Special need students - a little 0.309 0.457 0.328 0.469 -0.019
Special need students - some 0.147 0.350 0.184 0.387 -0.037
Special need students - a lot 0.064 0.243 0.081 0.272 -0.016
Shortage computer hardware - a little 0.140 0.343 0.236 0.423 -0.097***
Shortage computer hardware - some 0.197 0.396 0.207 0.404 -0.011
Shortage computer hardware - a lot 0.110 0.310 0.189 0.390 -0.079***
Shortage computer software - a little 0.168 0.371 0.294 0.454 -0.125***
Shortage computer software - some 0.146 0.350 0.198 0.397 -0.052
Shortage computer software - a lot 0.145 0.349 0.174 0.378 -0.029
Shortage support pc use - a little 0.181 0.380 0.217 0.411 -0.036
Shortage support pc use - some 0.148 0.351 0.185 0.387 -0.037
Shortage support pc use - a lot 0.089 0.282 0.137 0.343 -0.048*
Shortage of textbooks - a little 0.055 0.225 0.088 0.283 -0.034
Shortage of textbooks - some 0.045 0.205 0.044 0.205 0.001
Shortage of textbooks - a lot 0.011 0.103 0.083 0.275 -0.072***
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Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics – Class Characteristics (cont.)
Math Science
359 classes 734 classes
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference
Shortage instructional equipment - a little 0.180 0.380 0.314 0.463 -0.134***
Shortage instructional equipment - a some 0.123 0.326 0.193 0.394 -0.070**
Shortage instructional equipment - a lot 0.038 0.190 0.141 0.347 -0.103 ***
Shortage demonstrative equipment - a little 0.253 0.431 0.318 0.465 -0.065
Shortage demonstrative equipment - some 0.117 0.318 0.196 0.396 -0.080**
Shortage demonstrative equipment - a lot 0.044 0.203 0.189 0.391 -0.146***
Inadequate physical facilities - a little 0.148 0.352 0.219 0.413 -0.071*
Inadequate physical facilities - some 0.051 0.219 0.158 0.364 -0.107***
Inadequate physical facilities - a lot 0.030 0.169 0.131 0.337 -0.101***
High student teacher ratio - a little 0.230 0.417 0.292 0.454 -0.062
High student teacher ratio - some 0.132 0.335 0.204 0.402 -0.071**
High student teacher ratio - a lot 0.091 0.285 0.129 0.334 -0.038
Note: Probability weights and within school correlation are taken into account when estimating means
and standard deviations. Class variables are weighted by the number of students in each class.
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